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Utah Court of Appeals

DOCKET NO.

y&CG&a-CA

MAY 2 6 1993
MaryT.Noonan
Clftrk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JIM PRATT HANSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

CITATION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES

v.
GEORGE SUTTON, et al.,

Appeal No. 920686-CA

Defendants/Respondents,
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), U.R.App.P., Defendants/
Appellants George Sutton, individually, and in his capacity as
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, and
in his capacity as Trustee of the retained assets of Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company, Elaine B. Weis, individually and in her
capacity as former Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the
State of Utah, and the Utah Department of Financial Institutions,
respectfully submit this citation of supplemental authorities in
support of Defendants/Appellants' Brief.
The authorities were located by the undersigned counsel
while preparing for the oral argument in this matter set for May
26, 1993.

In particular, the authorities cited (especially Glenn

v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F. 2d 368 (10th Cir.
1989)) support Defendants/Appellants' argument a Court is not
required to grant a motion for leave to amend a complaint when
the plaintiff would otherwise have an absolute right to amend

under Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., had leave to amend not been
requested.

This argument is set forth on pages 50-55 of

Defendants/Appellants' Brief
The authorities and citations are as follows:
Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaqa-Belendez, 903 F. 2d 49, 59
(1st Cir. 1990).
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F. 2d
368 (10th Cir. 1989).
Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet. Inc., 670 F. 2d 129, 131
(9th Cir. 1982)
Mertens v. Hummell, 587 F. 2d 862, (7th Cir. 1978).
Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F. 2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir.
1991)
Shall v. Henry, 211 F. 2d 226, 230-31 ((7th Cir. 1954).
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Copies of these citations are attached hereto for the
Court's and other counsels' convenience.
DATED this *2.vTk

day of May, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General

^

BlfYCEjH, PETTEY'(#259£)
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for: the Utah Department
of Financial Institutions;
George Sutton, individually,
and as Commissioner of
Financial Institutions of the
State of Utah, and as Trustee
of the Retained Assets of
Murray First Thrift and Loan
Company; and Elaine B. Weis,
individually, and as former
Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of the State of
Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of May, 1993,

I did cause to be delivered by hand a true and exact copy of the
foregoing "Citation of Supplemental Authorities" to each of the
following:
Michael N. Emery, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorney for George Sutton, as
Commissioner in Possession of the
Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation of Utah, and the
Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation of Utah
Scott B. Mitchell, Esq.
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO
136 South Main Street, Suite 721
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants

^S/IM^IU
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feitures under § 881(aX6). See, e.g.t United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897.
Moreover, courts in this circuit and elsewhere have repeatedly applied the burdenshifting procedures and rules of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1615 to the forfeiture of real property.
See, e.g., United States v. Parcel of Land
and Residence Located Thereon at 5 Bell
Rock Rd, 896 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir.1990);
United States v. South 28.19 Acres of
Land, 694 F.Supp. 1252, 1253-54 (E.D.La.
1988); United States v. Premises Known
as 2639 Meetinghouse Rd, 633 F.Supp.
979, 986-87 (E.D.Pa.1986); see also United
States v. A Parcel of Land with a Building Located Thereon at 40 Moon Hill Rd,
884 F.2d 41, 42-43 (1st Cir.1989) (upholding
the forfeiture of real property pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)). Laliberte's argument of unconstitutional vagueness is without merit.
Even more meritJess is Laliberte's argument that the allocation of burdens under
19 U.S.C. § 1615 is unconstitutional with
respect to § 881 forfeitures. That argument has already been explicitly addressed
and rejected by this circuit. United States
v. $250,000, 808 F.2d at 900.
The judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
(O iMYNUMBfRSYSTj*^

S*

Jorge CORREA-MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
Rene ARRILLAGA-BELENDEZ, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 89-2011.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit
Heard March 7, 1990.
Decided April 30, 1990.
Former
administrative
employee
named to a trust position in Puerto Rico's

judicial system brought action against
three jurists, alleging that he had been
forced to resign in violation of his due
process and First Amendment rights. The
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, Chief Judge, dismissed. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Selya, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) employee did not
have due process property interest in continued employment; (2) allegation that employee was terminated "from his employment because of his close association with
[former administrative judge] * * * with
whom defendants have personal and political differences" stated no cause of action
for First Amendment violation under
§ 1983; and (3) District Court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to grant employee's request for leave to amend complaint.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Civil Procedure «=>1829
Despite highly deferential reading
which Court of Appeals accords litigant's
complaint under rule governing motions to
dismiss for failure to state claim, Court
need not credit bald assertions, periphrastic
circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vituperation. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Civil Rights «=>234
Civil rights plaintiff may not prevail on
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim
simply by asserting inequity and tacking on
self-serving conclusion that defendant was
motivated by discriminatory animus; alleged facts must specifically identify particular instances of discriminatory treatment
and, as logical exercise, adequately support
thesis that discrimination was unlawful.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.
C.A.
3. Constitutional Law e»277(2)
Engagement letter from personnel director to administrative employee named to
trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial system could not effectively confer constitu-
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tionally protected property interest on employee contrary to statutory/regulatory
framework for government employment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14; 3 L.P.R.A. §§ 1349-1351.
4. Master and Servant e=>2
Where employment scheme, whether
statutory, contractual, or mixed, is silent
on specific points, pocked with fissures, or
infected by serious strain of ambiguity,
employer's conduct or declarations may appropriately be used to fill gaps so as to
create constitutionally protected property
interest in continued employment. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
5. Constitutional Law e=»277(2)
Territories «=>23
Principles of fundamental fairness did
not afford administrative employee named
to trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial
system a constitutionally cognizable property interest in continued employment,
even though employee served judicial
branch well for seven years, toiling under
four administrative judges, none of whom
ever questioned his trustworthiness or
competence; employee's subjective expectancies could not override unambiguous
commands of civil service laws under which
employee could be dismissed in discretion
of nominating authority. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 3 L.P.
R.A. §§ 1349-1351.

8. Master and Servant <S=>30(1)
Fact that superiors have not exercised
discretion to dismiss at-will employee does
not normally preclude them from changing
their mind, nor does it preclude new superior officer from exercising prerogative.
9. Constitutional Law $=>277(2)
Absent adequate allegation of discrimination based on political affiliation of former administrative employee named to
trust position in Puerto Rico's judicial system, regulation allegedly providing that
employees "shall receive just and equitable
treatment, without discrimination of any
type based on • * * political affiliation" did
not apply to create constitutionally cognizable property interest in continued employment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.
C.A. § 1983.
10. Federal Courts «=>915
Substantive due process claim of terminated public employee which was not
pressed on appeal was waived. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
11. Constitutional Law e=»82(ll)
Lack of property interest in continued
employment cannot defeat otherwise actionable claim that termination of employee
violated employee's First Amendment
rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1, 14; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.

12. Civil Rights «=>235(3)
Allegation that administrative employee named to trust position in Puerto Rico's
judicial system was terminated "from his
6. Constitutional Law e»277(2)
Length of employment and good be- employment because of his close associahavior, in and of themselves, customarily tion with [former administrative judge]
do not create constitutionally protected • * * with whom defendants have personal
property interest in continued employment. and political differences" stated no cause
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. of action for First Amendment violation
under § 1983; employee did not claim that
§ 1983.
defendants discriminated against him on
bas\s
of his political beliefs or advocacy of
7. Constitutional Law «=»277(2)
ideas. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1; 42 U.S.
Absent legal source other than superiC.A. § 1983.
or officer's unilateral and/or unauthorized
actions contrary to Puerto Rico law, 13. Constitutional Law $=>91
government worker's pretensions to constiFirst Amendment does not protect
tutionally cognizable property right in his against deprivations arising out of act of
employment must be turned aside. U.S. associataon unless act itself, such as joining
C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. church or political party, speaking out on
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matters of public interest, or advocacy of
reform, falls within scope of constitutionally protected activities. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 1.
14. Civil Rights *=>235(3)
Merely juxtaposing protected characteristic, such as someone else's politics,
with fact that public employee was treated
unfairly is not enough to state First
Amendment claim; what is needed is a
fact-specific showing that causal connection exists linking defendants' conduct, as
manifested in adverse employment decision, to employee's politics. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
15. International Law e»10.23
Absent cognizable federal question,
federal court cannot intrude upon another
sovereign's civil service system and declare
itself court of last resort to hear personnel
appeals addressed to wisdom, or even good
faith, of staffing decisions reached by
government actors.
16. Federal Courts e»794
While Court of Appeals, in reviewing
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim,
must draw all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs favor, it is not obligated to credit
every conceivable inference. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A.

tion that employee had unearthed viable
basis for his stated claim or that there was
some hope for another, legally sufficient,
claim. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(6), 28
U.S.C.A.
Charles S. Hey Maestre, Rio Piedras,
P.R., for plaintiff, appellant.
Zuleika Llovet, Hato Rey, P.R., with
whom Hector Rivera-Cruz, Bayamon, P.R.,
Secretary of Justice, Jorge I. Perez-Diaz,
Sol. Gen., John F. Nevares, and Saldana,
Rey, Moran & Alvarado, Hato Rey, P.R.,
were on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before BREYER, TORRUELLA and
SELYA, Circuit Judges.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), plaintiff-appellant Jorge Correa-Martinez (Correa) sued three jurists in federal district
court. Asking that the judges be judged,
Correa-Martinez alleged that he had been
forced to resign from the judicial branch of
Puerto Rico's government in violation of
his due process and first amendment
rights. The district court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Fed.R.
Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.

17. Federal Civil Procedure «»828, 851
Though district court's denial of
chance to amend complaint may constitute
abuse of discretion if no sufficient justification appears, district court need not grant
every request to amend; where amendment would be futile or would serve no
legitimate purpose, district court should
not needlessly prolong matters. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we
take the well-pleaded facts as they appear
in the complaint, indulging every reasonable inference in plaintiffs favor. See
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,
889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989); Gooley i>.
Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st
Cir.1988).

18. Federal Civil Procedure «»851
District court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant terminated government employee's request for leave to
amend civil rights complaint absent indica-

The administrative arm of the Puerto
Rico judicial system is formally known as
the Office of Court Administration of the
General Court of Justice (OCA).1 There
are two personnel classifications within the

1. The defendants, appellees before us, are Hon.
Rene Arrillaga-Belendez, a superior court judge
and OCA's administrative director; Hon. Luis A.
Juan-Alvarez, a superior court judge and quondam administrator of the Guayama Judicial Region; and Hon. Victor M. Pons Nunez, the Chief

Justice of Puerto Rico. The two superior court
judges were sued in their official and personal
capacities whereas Chief Justice Pons was sued
only as the authority "ultimately responsible for
administration" of the court system.

I. BACKGROUND
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judicial branch, Uniform Service and Central Service. "Officers and employees of
the Uniform Service may be suspended or
dismissed only for just cause prior to the
formulation of charges, and they shall have
the right to defend themselves and be
heard in the manner provided by law."
P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4, Appx. XIII, Reg. 16
(1978) (district court's translation). In contrast, "[o]fficers and employees of the Central Service, except judges, may be suspended or dismissed by the Nominating
Authority in its discretion." Id.
Correa toiled in OCA's vineyards from
1981 through 1988. When originally hired,
he received an engagement letter telling
him that he was being named to a "trust"
position in the Central Service.2 The letter
also warned that continued employment
was dependent upon his "efficiency, attitude, availability and compliance with the
regulations in effect." Although he started at a lower rank, Correa served for several years as Executive Director I, Guayama Judicial Region. He describes his functions as "essentially administrative in character." His performance evaluations were
uniformly favorable and led to a number of
merit-related pay increases.
Near the end of 1988, the halcyon days
drew to a close. Judge Juan-Alvarez became the interim administrator of the Guayama Judicial Region and asked plaintiff to
resign. Plaintiff complied. His resignation was officially accepted by Judge Arrillaga-Belendez. The complaint alleges that
defendants did not afford Correa a hearing
and gave no reason for forcing him to quit.
Plaintiff now attacks on two fronts.
Contending that he possessed a "clear and
substantial property interest" in continued
employment at OCA, he maintains that his
constructive discharge, unaccompanied by
any hearing or explanation, violated procedural due process. Asserting simultaneously that the defendants cashiered him
because of his close association with a for2. In Puerto Rico, "trust" positions Cde confianza") are noncareer positions which do not have
the civil service protection accorded "career"
positions ("de permanencia"). See P.RLaws
Ann tit. 3, §§ 1349-51 (1978) (executive
branch). I n contrast to a 'career' employee, an

met administrative judge, he maintains
that his ouster ran afoul of the first amendment.
The district court found both offensives
lacking in firepower and dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that Correa, as a
trust employee in the Central Service, had
no property interest in his position and
could thus be fired in the employer's discretion without notice or hearing. The court
also rejected the first amendment claim,
stating that "[m]ere personal and political
differences between the defendants and a
third party ... cannot support the allegations of political discrimination against
plaintiff." This appeal ensued.
II. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING APPELr
LATE REVIEW
In the Rule 12(b)(6) milieu, an appellate
court operates under the same constraints
that bind the district court, that is, we may
affirm a dismissal for failure to state a
claim only if it clearly appears, according to
the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot
recover on any viable theory. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48, 78 S.Ct. 99,
101-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Dartmouth
Review, 889 F.2d at 16. In making that
critical determination, we accept plaintiff's
well-pleaded factual averments and indulge
every reasonable inference hospitable to
his case. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514.
[1] In the menagerie of the Civil Rules,
the tiger patrolling the courthouse gates is
rather tame, but "not entirely ... toothless." Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16.
Despite the highly deferential reading
which we accord a litigant's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we need not credit bald
assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions,
unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vituperation. See Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97
L.Ed.2d 765 (1987). Moreover, the rule
employee of 'trust' may, under Puerto Rico law,
be discharged at will and without cause." Rodriguez Rodriguez v. Munoz Munoz, 808 F.2d 138,
140 (1st Or. 1986), accord Ruiz-Roche v. bausell 848 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1988).
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does not entitle a plaintiff to rest on "sub- Discrimination based on unprotected charjective characterizations" or conclusory de- acteristics or garden-variety unfairness will
scriptions of "a general scenario which not serve.
could be dominated by unpleaded facte."
With these precepts squarely in mind, we
Dewey v. Univ. of New Hampshire, 694 proceed to evaluate Correa's allegations.
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982), cert denied, 461
U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1301
(1983). We understand that, for pleading III. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM
As a prerequisite to his due process
purposes, the dividing line between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions "is claim, plaintiff must demonstrate the existoften blurred." Dartmouth Review, 889 ence of a constitutionally cognizable propF.2d at 16. But the line must be plotted:* erty or liberty interest. See Paul v. Davis,
It is only when such conclusions are logi- 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47
cally compelled, or at least supported, by L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Correa seeks to scale
the stated facts, that is, when the sug- this hurdle by alleging that he had a propgested inference rises to what experience erty interest in his employment. He falls
indicates is an acceptable level of proba- far short.
bility, that 'conclusions' become 'facts'
[3] Constitutionally protected property
for pleading purposes.
interests originate in extra-constitutional
Id.
sources; they are "created and their dimen[2] There is another principle at work sions are defined by existing rules or
as well. We have frequently recognized
understandings that stem from an indepenthat, in cases where civil rights violations
dent source such as state law
" Board
are alleged, particular care is required to
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92
balance the liberality of the Civil Rules
S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972);
with the need to prevent abusive and unfair
accord Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudervexation of defendants. See, e.g., id.;
mill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487,
Dewey, 694 F.2d at 3; Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977), cert, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Bishop v.
denied, 434 U.S. 1077, 98 S.Ct. 1268, 55 Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct 2074,
L.Ed.2d 783 (1978). A civil rights com- 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Rosarioplaint must "outline facts sufficient to con- Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314,
vey specific instances of unlawful discrimi- 319 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc); Ruiz-Roche v.
nation." Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at Lausell, 848 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1988). Here,
16. Put another way, a plaintiff may not plaintiff claims to derive his property interprevail simply by asserting an inequity and est principally from the circumstances of
tacking on the self-serving conclusion that his hiring.
the defendant was motivated by a discrimiCorrea acknowledges that OCA's ennatory animus. The alleged facts must gagement letter notified him that he had
specifically identify the particular in- been named to a trust position in the Censtances) of discriminatory treatment and, tral Service.1 He also concedes that Cenas a logical exercise, adequately support tral Service employees are subject to disthe thesis that the discrimination was un- missal at the employer's discretion. See
lawful. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4, Appx. XIII, Reg. 16.
at 20; see also Keyes v. Secretary of the These verities notwithstanding, Correa arNavy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026-27 (1st Cir. gues that the written confirmation of his
1988); Johnson v. General Elec. Co., 840 particular appointment "tempered" the
F.2d 132, 138 (1st Cir.1988); Springer v. ramifications normally attendant to the
Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 880 (1st Cir.1987). post. In this respect, he points out that the
3. According to the Rules of Administration of
the Personnel System of the Judicial Branch,
positions in the Central Service include "[positions of assistants to the executives and/or di-

recting officers ... which because of their functions require personal trust." P.R.Laws Ann. tit.
4, Appx. XII, Rule 4(l)(c) (plaintiffs translation).
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engagement letter admonished that "your phone Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.
permanency in the [position] will depend 1988).* In those cases, the plaintiffs were
upon your efficiency, attitude, disposition hired in violation of the Puerto Rico Perand . . . compliance with regulations in ef- sonnel Act or some other recruitment profect" from time to time. Plaintiff suggests tocol. See, e.g., Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d
that OCA thereby limited its discretion, at 319. Notwithstanding that the fault
granting him job security so long as he was entirely the nominating authority's, we
fulfilled these few written conditions.
ruled that an employer's "failure to abide
Appellant's thesis boils down to the idea by the rules when [employees] were hired
that the engagement letter ex proprio trig- . . . has nothing to do with . . . whether or
ore comprised an independent source for a not Puerto Rico law gave the plaintiffs a
legitimate expectation of continued employ- sufficient 'property interest* in their jobs as
ment, and hence, for a property interest. to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth
We give Correa high marks for ingenuity Amendment" de Feliciano, 873 F.2d at
but a failing grade in persuasion. The 454; see also Franco v. Municipality of
engagement letter clearly informed plain- Cidra, 113 D.P.R. 334, 337 (1982) (municitiff that he was being hired to a trust pality's "decisions and actions, which were
position. He accepted the characterization contrary to and incompatible with the Perthen—and must accept it now. Trust em- sonnel Act, lacked sufficient legal force to
ployees may be freely dismissed in the dis- create and ratify a career position and apcretion of the nominating authority (here, pointment that was essentially a confidenOCA); indeed, the very essence of trust tial position"); Colon-Perez v. Mayor of
positions is their lack of permanency. See,
Municipality ofCeiba, 112 D.P.R. 934, 940
e.g., Ruiz-Roche, 848 F.2d at 7. So, plain(1982) (same).
tiffs construct has force only if, and to the
Unless we are prepared to abandon the
extent that, the personnel director could
effectively limit OCA's statutory powers by rationale of this line of cases, it must foladopting terms and conditions outside of, low that OCA's personnel director could
and flatly inconsistent with, the legislative- not effectively confer a property interest
ly mandated criteria. This is a Houdini-in- on plaintiff merely by making statements
reverse argument, which assumes that a contrary to the Commonwealth's extensive
government employer can be securely statutory/regulatory framework anent
locked into a box that the legislature has government employment. Cf. Goyco de
purposely left wide open. We find alto- Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 688
gether untenable the notion that civil ser- (1st Cir.1988) (government employer may
vice laws can so nimbly be sidestepped. not insulate employment decisions from
We have regularly held that, under Puer- constitutional scrutiny "by the relatively
to Rico law, government employees hired simple expedient of passing a rule or enactillegally to permanent or career positions ing a by-law"). In Puerto Rico, an incomare neither invested with property interests ing administration has a legislatively asin continued employment nor entitled to the sured right to fill jobs implicating the emdue process protections which inure to their ployer's confidence or trust with persons of
legally hired counterparts. See Rosario- the administration's choosing. We do not
Torres, 889 F.2d at 319; de Feliciano v. de believe that this right can be subjected to
Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 452-55 (1st Cir,), cert. casual deprivation or that the legislature's
denied, — U.S.
, 110 S.Ct 148, 107 will can so easily be thwarted. Indeed,
L.Ed.2d 107 (1989); Santiago-Negron v. were plaintiffs general argument to preCastro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 436-37 (1st vail, the carefully thought-out civil service
Cir.1989); Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Tele- system could easily be wrecked by mid-ech* Judge Torruella continues to believe that this
line of authority is wrongly decided, see Rosar>
io-Torres, 889 F.2d at 325-26 (Torruella, J., dissenting), and in any event, is of the opinion that

present reliance on the same is unnecessary to
decide the issues raised by this appeal. He
therefore disassociates himself from this portion of the opinion.
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elon managers bent on shaping the system
to their own ends.
To be sure, an employer's unilateral declarations, promises, or conduct regarding
conditions of continued employment might
in some circumstances create a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement to job tenure." Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602, 92 S.Ct.
2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In Perry, for example, the Court held that a
professor should have been given an opportunity to prove his claim that he had developed a property interest under the college's
unwritten "de facto " tenure program. Id
at 603, 92 S.Ct at 2700. The Court noted
that the "absence of . . . an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the
possibility that a teacher has a 'property'
interest in re-employment," especially
where the employer's practices or representations supplement other, explicit contractual provisions. Id at 601-02, 92 S.Ct. at
2699-2700; see also Cheveras Pacheco v.
Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 127 (1st
Cir.1987) (recognizing that interstitial or
supplemental representations might create
constitutionally protectable property interests).
[4] The Perry rule depends, of course,
on perforation, that is, on pockets of uncertainty. Where an employment scheme—
whether statutory, contractual, or mixed—
is silent on specific points, pocked with
fissures, or infected by a serious strain of
ambiguity, an employer's conduct or declarations may quite appropriately be used to
fill the gaps. In the case at bar, however,
there were no gaps to fill. The written
assurances given to plaintiff, to the extent
they can be interpreted to mean what plaintiff says they mean (a matter as to which
we take no view), stand in direct contravention of a comprehensive network of statutory and regulatory directives governing
the terms of Central Service employment
and trust positions generally. It would
rock the foundations of that system to rely
on the arguably contradictory terms of a
personnel director's welcoming missive to
4. Correa's case, we might add, is considerably
less compelling than the cited cases in that,
unlike the employees in, say, Rosario-Torres,

supervene the letter of law. Thus, the
engagement letter could not and did not
create a cognizable property interest in the
Executive Director I position. Cf RuizRoche, 848 F.2d at 8 (government employer's naked promise of future career employment insufficient to create property interest on part of trust employee).
[5,6] There is yet another base to be'
touched. Both apart from, and in concert
with, the engagement letter, Correa also
argues his due process claim in terms of
"fundamental fairness." We are not unsympathetic to his plea. Plaintiff served
the judicial branch well for seven years.
He toiled under four administrative judges,
none of whom ever questioned his trustworthiness or competence. In short, taking the complaint at face value, he did
nothing wrong. Be that as it may, length
of employment and good behavior, in and
of themselves, customarily do not create a
property interest in continued employment.
See Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-02, 92 S.Ct. at
2699-2700; Bollow i>. Fed. Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th
Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102
S.Ct. 1449, 71 L.Ed.2d 662 (1982). That
plaintiff claims to have performed mainly
administrative duties is beside the point;
what matters, in the due process context, is
the legislative classification of Correa's position as one of trust in the Central Service.
[7,8] As in the cases where employees
were assigned career positions in an irregular manner and had good reason to believe
that their positions were secure, plaintiffs
subjective expectancies cannot override the
unambiguous commands of the civil service
laws. Without some legal source other
than a superior officer's unilateral and/or
unauthorized actions contrary to Puerto
Rico law, a government worker's pretensions to a constitutionally cognizable property right in his employment must be
turned aside. See Rosario-Torres, 889
F.2d at 316; de Feliciano, 873 F.2d at
453-55; Santiago-Negron, 865 F.2d at
436; Kauffman, 841 F.2d at 1173.4
S89 F.2d at 316, Correa was clearly informed
from the beginning that his position was one of
trust within the Central Service. Moreover, the

56

903 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

[9] Plaintiff tries unsuccessfully to bolster his due process claim by pointing to
the Regulations of Administration of the
Personnel System of the Judicial Branch,
specifically RR.Laws Ann. tit 4, Appx.
XIII, Reg. 2 (employees "shall receive just
and equitable treatment, without discrimination of any type based on race, creed,
color, sex, social condition or political affiliation") (plaintiffs translation). Without
an adequate allegation of discrimination
based on plaintiffs political affiliation, see
infra Part IV, the regulation is simply not
in play. Nor can the other, arguably ambiguous, regulatory language to which Correa alludes, e.g., P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 4,
Appx. XIII, Reg. 3, be construed to contradict the fundamental merit principle embodied in Puerto Rico's extensive public employment scheme.
[10] To say more would be to paint the
lily. Because the plaintiff has not alleged
facts sufficient to support a reasonable expectation of, or recognizable property interest in, continued government employment,
defendants were not constitutionally required to afford him any process before
ending his OCA service. Insofar as the
motion to dismiss addressed the due process claim, it was properly granted.5
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
[11] The foregoing explication does not
entirely settle matters. Correa also contends that his first amendment rights were
abridged. That statement of claim, if otherwise actionable, cannot be defeated by
the lack of a property interest See Branti
fact that superiors had not exercised their discretion to dismiss an at-will employee does not
normally preclude them from changing their
mind, nor does it preclude a new superior officer from exercising the prerogative.
5. Although plaintiffs complaint mentions substantive due process as well as procedural due
process, he does not press the former point on
appeal. In view of "the settled appellate rule
that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived," United States
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990), we
omit any discussion of substantive due process.
6. We use the term "nonpolicymakers," perhaps
inartfully, as a shorthand reference to those

v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n. 6, 100 S.Ct.
1287, 1291 n. 6, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980);
Santiago-Negron, 865 F.2d at 436; Cheveras Pacheco, 809 F.2d at 128. As the
Court has taught:
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to
a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely.
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697.
[12] The crux of the first amendment
initiative is the allegation that the defendants "were motivated by their discriminatory intent to terminate plaintiff from his
employment because of his close association with [the former administrative judge]
. . . with whom defendants have personal
and political differences/' The district
court held that no cause of action was
stated. We agree.
At a bare minimum, plaintiffs burden at
the pleading stage was to allege facts
which, if proven, would demonstrate that
his forced resignation was brought about
by discrimination on the basis of some constitutionally safeguarded interest. See
Branti, 445 U.S. at 515, 517, 100 S.Ct. at
1293, 1294; ML Healthy City Bd. ofEduc.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568,
576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Cordero v. de
Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989).
The Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment protects nonpolicymakers from
being drummed out of public service on the
basis of their political affiliation or advocacy of ideas.* See Branti, 445 U.S. at 517,
instances where, because the affected employees
are neither "involved in policymaking, the communication of political ideas, or sensitive tasks
connected with the policymaking function/'
Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319,
322 (1st Cir.1987), nor "occupy[ing] positions of
... unusually intimate propinquity to government leaders," id. at 324, partisan affiliation is
an inappropriate job criterion. Inasmuch as
Correa has not alleged facts sufficient to permit
a finding that a constitutionally sacrosanct interest was transgressed, see infra, we need not
decide whether political loyalty was a permissible requirement for the position that he held.
For the same reason, we have no occasion to
reach appellant's contention that this case differed from other public employment cases be-
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100 S.Ct at 1294 (dismissals actionable if
plaintiffs "were discharged 'solely for the
reason that they were not affiliated with or
sponsored by [a particular] Party'") (citation omitted); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 357, 96 S.Ct 2673, 2681, 49 L.Ed.2d
547 (1976) (plurality op.) (first amendment
protects "freedom to associate with others
for the common advancement of political
beliefs and ideas"); cf. Perry, 408 U.S. at
597-98, 92 S.Ct at 2697-98 (government
"may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in
freedom of speech"). We have myriad
cases in the same mold. See, e.g., Agosto
de Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d
1209, 1212 n. 1 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc)
(setting forth partial listing); RosarioTorres, 889 F.2d at 315 (similar). The case
at bar is at a further remove.
Here, plaintiff does not allege that his
politics, his ideology, or his advocacy of
political goals led to his downfall. The
complaint is altogether silent as to whether
Correa had any partisan affiliation or espoused any controversial political views. It
does not say if, or how, Correa's affiliations or views differed from those of the
incumbent judges. Refined to bare essence, then, plaintiff does not claim that
defendants discriminated against him on
the basis of his political beliefs or advocacy
of ideas—discrimination which would implicate an interest shielded by the Bill of
Rights. Rather, he asserts only that defendants had "personal and political differences" with an unrelated individual, Judge
Padilla (the jurist formerly in charge of the
Guayama Judicial Region), and discriminated against him (plaintiff) because of his
"close association" with Judge Padilla. We
do not think that such discrimination, if it
existed, impinged upon a constitutionally
protected right
cause he was an employee of the judicial branch
of government. No matter how tantalizing issues may appear, courts must be reluctant to
plunge headlong into uncharted decisional waters where no need exists.
7. Appellant has not claimed that, although he
was in fact nonpolitical, defendants forced him
to resign because they (mistakenly) thought he

[13] Various relationships have been
sheltered under the capacious constitutional tent of freedom of association. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30,
83 S.Ct 328, 335-36, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)
(first amendment protects "vigorous advocacy" and right "to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas"),
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78
S.Ct. 1163,1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (Bill
of Rights safeguards "beliefs sought to be
advanced by association [which] pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural
matters"). Nevertheless, it is clear that, in
constitutional terms, freedom of association is not to be defined unreservedly. Entry into the constitutional orbit requires
more than a mere relationship. The Constitution may be interposed as a barrier to
state action only to the extent that the
targeted association is characterizable in
terms of some particular constitutional concern. See United States v. Comley, 890
F.2d 539, 544 (1st Cir.1989); see also L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§ 12-23, at 702-03 (1978). Put another
way, the first amendment does not protect
against all deprivations arising out of an
act of association unless the act itself—say,
joining a church or a political party, speaking out on matters of public interest, advocacy of reform—falls within the scope of
activities eligible for inclusion within the
constitutional tent.
Analyzed in this light, Correa's complaint
was vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. The
complaint did not say that plaintiff possessed, or expressed, any significant political views; indeed, implicit in plaintiffs arguments is the suggestion that he, himself,
scrupulously avoided partisan political involvement7 The complaint contained no
facts regarding the political contours, if
any, of Correa's relationship with Judge
was a member of the opposition party. We
express no opinion, therefore, on whether a
discharge which arises not out of an employee's
political activity, but out of the government employer's belief, wrongly held, that the employee
was in league with the opposition party, would
be actionable under the rubric of the first
amendment.
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Padilla. It contained no facts capable of
supporting an inference that the relationship came within the constitutional orbit.
It did not maintain that defendants knew
anything about plaintiffs politics or that
their motivation related in the slightest to
plaintiffs exercise of any first amendment
or other constitutionally protected right.
This deficit, we suggest, leaves a chasmal gap—one not bridged by plaintiffs
bald assertion that defendants constructively discharged him due to his relationship with Judge Padilla. At most, the complaint might support an inference that politics was in the air between defendants and
Judge Padilla. Nevertheless, a politically
charged atmosphere of that sort, without
more, provided no basis for a reasonable
inference that defendants' employment decisions about plaintiff were tainted by
their disregard of plaintiffs first amendment rights. Cf Dartmouth Review, 889
F.2d at 16 ("smoke alone is not enough to
force the defendants to a trial to prove that
their actions were not . . . discriminatory")
(citation omitted). Absent a constitutionally protected aspect, a "close relationship"
with a third party is insufficient to invoke
the prophylaxis of the Elrod-Branti rule,
notwithstanding that consideration of the
third party's political beliefs may have
entered into the decisionmaking calculus.

that a causal connection exists linking defendants' conduct, as manifested in the adverse employment decision, to plaintiffs
politics, that is, the plaintiff must have pled
facts adequate to raise a plausible inference that he was subjected to discrimination based on his political affiliation or
views. No such facts were marshalled
here.
[15] We make one final observation.
We do not suggest that if, as plaintiff
would have it, defendants chose to jettison
a competent, hardworking employee because of his loyalty, real or imagined, to a
former superior, the court system would be
well served or fairness achieved. But that
is not the point. In the absence of a cognizable federal question, a federal court cannot intrude upon another sovereign's civil
service system and declare itself a court of
last resort to hear personnel appeals addressed to the wisdom, or even the good
faith, of staffing decisions reached by the
government actors. Cf, e.g., Freeman v.
Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331,
1341 (1st Cir.1988) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act "does not stop a company
from discharging an employee for any reason (fair or unfair) or for no reason, so
long as the decision to fire does not stem
from the person's age"); Gray v. New
England Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir.1986) (civil rights
laws do not forestall cashiering an employee "arbitrarily or with ill will," absent prohibited discrimination).

[14] Of course, plaintiff tells us that
political association is the protected characteristic, but that approach, too, rings hollow. Merely juxtaposing a protected char[16] We have said enough. While Rule
acteristic—someone else's politics—with
the fact that plaintiff was treated unfairly 12(b)(6) requires deference to the wellis not enough to state a constitutional pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint,
claim. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d we are not obligated to give free rein to
at 19; see also Medina-Munoz v. R.J. imagination. See Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st ("court need not conjure up unpled allegaCir.1990) (in age discrimination case, plain- tions or contrive elaborately arcane
tiff must show a discriminatory animus scripts"). Although we must draw all reabased on his age); White v. Vathally, 732 sonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, we
F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.) (similar; Title are not obligated to credit every conceivaVII), cert denied, 469 U.S. 933, 105 S.Ct ble inference. See Gray, 792 F.2d at 256
831, 83 LEd.2d 267 (1984); Jafree v. Bar- ^"unreasonable and speculative inferences"
ber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir.1982) (factu- cannot be allowed to bottom a civil rights
al allegations must show that protected action). The evenhanded application of
quality "was the reason for dismissal"). these principles necessitates that we affirm
What is needed is a fact-specific showing the ruling that plaintiffs complaint failed
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to state an actionable fii st amendment
claim,
V. THE REQUEST TO AMEND
After defendants moved to dismiss in the
district court, plaintiff had an opportunity
to amend his complaint as of right.8 Eschewing such a course, plaintiff instead
opposed the motion arid inserted in his opposition a request that he be allowed to file
an amended complaint if the 'motion was
granted. The district court never acted on
the request. Correa now portrays this
omission as an abuse of the court's; discretion.
[171 Because leave to amend "shall be
freely given when justice so requires," Fed.
R Civ.P 15(a), a district court's denial of a
chance to amend may constitute an abuse
of discretion if no sufficient justification
appears, See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222
(1962). On the other hand, a district court
need not grant every request to amend,
come what may. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir.1989);
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Gamiy Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517-18 (1st
Cir.1989). Where an amendment would be
futile or would serve no legitimate purpose,
the district court should not needlessly prolong matters. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182,
83 S.Ct at 230. For aught that appears,
this case is in that vein.
We have examined the amendments sug
gested in plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss and in his appellate brief.
We find nothing of decretory significance,
that is, nothing which would repair the
8. A party may amend "once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served." Fed.RXiv.P. 15(a). Inasmuch as
defendants' dismissal motion did not constitute
a responsive pleading, see Dartmouth Review,
889 F.2d at 22; McDonald v. Hall 579 F2d 120,
121 (1st Cir.1978), plaintiff was not required to
seek leave to amend.
9. "We note in passing that plaintiff offhandedly
inserted the conditional request to amend in his
opposition below and did not renew it after the
district court ruled. He may very well have
waived the point. See generally Dartmouth Re
view, 889 F.2d at 22 ("In this circuit, 'it is a
party's first obligation to seel any relief that

holes in Correa's case, For example, plain
tiff offered to submit the unexpurgated
text of the engagement letter, but there is
no indication that any statements other
than the excerpts already contained in the
complaint would be relevant. Plaintiff also
offered several sworn statements substantiating what the complaint already alleged
about plaintiffs excellent work record, the
nature of his duties, and OCA's wonted
personnel practices. These submissions
would plainly have been superfluous; the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint,
without buttressing, were taken as true for
purposes of defendants' Rule 12(bX6) motion. See supra Part II and cases cited.
Moreover, as we have explained at some
length, this case is not about the essential
justness of defendants' decision to oust
plaintiff from his governmental post; it is
about the presence or absence of a claim
cognizable under 'the federal Constitution
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
[18] Having culled plaintiffs representations as to what he might in good faith
be able to allege, we are satisfied that this
is an instance where "the 'new' facts are of
the same genre as the 'old' facts
"
Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 23. Without any indication that plaintiff had unearthed a viable basis for his stated claim,
or that there was some hope for another
(legally sufficient) claim, the court below
'did not abuse its discretion in failing to
grant Correa's request for leave to amend f
V I. C O N C L U S I O N
; .;. •..
To recapitulate, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate anything more than a unilatermight fairly have been thought available in the
district court before seeking it on appeal.'")
(quoting Beaulieu v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 865 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1st Cir.1989));
Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635-36
(1st Cir.1988) ("When in the ordinary case, 'the
pleader has stood upon his pleading and appealed from a judgment of dismissal, amendment
will not ordinarily be permitted ... if the dismissal is affirmed.'") (citation omitted); cf.
James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 77-78 (1st Cir.1983),
cert, denied, 467 US. 1209, 104 S.Ct. 2397, 81
LEd.2d 354 (1984). We have elected, however,
to address the question frontally.
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al expectation of continued employment at
OCA. While he may or may not have been
treated fairly, we find nothing in the record
which might demonstrate that he had a
property interest in his job or that constructive discharge was offensive to the
Constitution. Plaintiffs first amendment
claim, which pivots not on his politics but
on the persona and politics of a third party,
will not wash. And because Correa's proffered amendments were designed to amplify substantively defective statements of
claim rather than to repair the defects,
there was no good reason to allow the
filing of an amended complaint.
We need go no further. Correa's suit
was appropriately dismissed. The order
and judgment below must therefore be
Affirmed,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
Pardon and Parole <3=>80
Searches and Seizures $=>69
Parolee was properly arrested in his
own home even though arresting officer
did not possess judicial warrant, inasmuch
as officer acted in good faith at request of
parole authorities who, in accordance with
parole regulation, had found reasonable
cause to order parolee's detention as suspected parole violator; thus, officer's seizure of shotgun in plain view was legal.
U.S.C.A. CoP'tAmend. 4.
Francis X. Mackey, Providence, R.I., for
defendant, appellant.
Margaret E. Curran, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Providence, R.L, with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for appeliec«
Before TORRUELLA and SELYA,
Circuit Judges, and BOWNES, Senior
Circuit Judge.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Edward CARDONA,
Defendant, Appellant
No. 88-1537.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
Heard Jan. 10, 1990.
Decided May 10, 1990.

Defendant was convicted, in the United
States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, Francis J. Boyle, Chief
Judge, of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Selya, Circuit Judge,
held that defendant, as parolee, was properly arrested in his own home even though
arresting officer did not possess judicial
warrant
Affirmed.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.
This case requires us, for the first time,
to explore the interstices and margins of
the Court's opinion in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct 3164, 97
L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Having completed this
journey into fourth amendment jurisprudence, we hold that a parolee may be arrested in his own home by a police officer
not possessing a judicial warrant when the
police officer acts in good faith at the request of parole authorities who, in accordance with a parole regulation, have found
reasonable cause to order the individual's
detention as a suspected parole violator.

I. BACKGROUND
Defendant-appellant Edward Cardona,
previously convicted of a felony in New
York, was on parole in Rhode Island pursuant to an interstate parole compact. After
defendant's Rhode Island parole officer reported problems, a parole violation warrant
(PVW) was issued by the New York parole
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FOMAN v. DAVIS, EXECUTRIX.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT.

No 41

Argued November 14, 1962—Decided December 3, 1962

A Federal Distnct Court dismissed petitioner's complaint in a civil
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted Petitioner promptly moved to vacate the judgment and
amend the complaint so as to state an alternative theory for
recovery Before the Court ruled on those motions, petitioner filed
notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal Subsequentl>, the
Distnct Court denied the motions to vacate the judgment and
to amend the complaint, and petitioner filed notice of appeal from
that denial On appeal, the parties briefed and argued the ments
of both the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of petitioner's
motions The Court of Appeals treated the first notice of appeal
as premature, because of the then pending motion to vacate, and
it dismissed that appeal It held that the second notice of appeal
was ineffective to review the judgment of dismissal, because it
failed to specify that the appeal *as from that judgment, and it
affirmed denial of petitioner's motions, on the ground that there
was nothing in the record to support a finding that the Distnct
Court had abused its discretion in refusing to allo\s amendment
of the complaint Held •
1 On the record in this case, the Court of Appeals erred m
narrow 1> reading the second notice of appeal as applying only to
the denial of petitioner's motions, since petitioner's intention to
seek review of both the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of
her motions was manifest from the record as a whole Pp 181-182
2 The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the Distnct
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment of
dismissal in order to allow amendment of the complaint, since it
appears from the record that the amendment uould have done no
more than state an alternative theory of recovery, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 (a) declares that leave to amend "shall be
freely given when justice so requires," and denial of the motion
without an> apparent justifying reason uas an abuse of discretion
P 182
292 F. 2d 85, reversed.
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Milton Bordwin argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
Roland E. Shaine argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the briefs was Richard R, Caples.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Petitioner filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that, in exchange for petitioner's promise to care for
and support her mother, petitioner's father had agreed
not to make a will, thereby assuring petitioner of an intestate share of the father's estate; it was further alleged
that petitioner had fully performed her obligations under
the oral agreement, but that contrary thereto the father
had devised his property to respondent, his second wrife
and executrix. Petitioner sought recovery of what would
have been her intestate share of the father's estate. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the oral agreement was unenforceable under the
applicable state statute of frauds. Accepting respondent's
contention, the District Court entered judgment on December 19, 1960, dismissing petitioner's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted.
On December 20, 1960, petitioner filed motions to vacate
the judgment and to amend the complaint to assert a
right of recovery in quantum meruit for performance
of the obligations which were the consideration for the
assertedly unenforceable oral contract. On January 17,
1961, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the judgment
of December 19,1960. On January 23,1961, the District
Court denied petitioner's motions to vacate the judgment
and to amend the complaint. On January 26,1961, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from denial of the motions.
On appeal, the parties briefed and argued the merits
of dismissal of the complaint and denial of petitioner's
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motions by the District Court. Notwithstanding, the
Court of Appeals of its own accord dismissed the appeal
insofar as taken from the District Court judgment of
December 1$, 1960, and affirmed the orders of the District
Court entered January 23, 1961. 292 F. 2d 85. This
Court granted certiorari. 368 U. S. 951.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that in the absence of
a specific designation of the provision of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure under which the December 20, 1960,
motion to vacate was filed, the motion would be treated
as filed pursuant to Rule 59 (e), rather than under Rule
60 ( b ) ; 1 since, under Rule 73 (a), 2 a motion under Rule
59 suspends the running of time within which an appeal
may be perfected, the first notice of appeal was treated
as premature in view of the then pending motion to vacate
and of no effect. The Court of Appeals held the second
notice of appeal, filed January 26, 1961, ineffective to
review the December 19, 1960, judgment dismissing the
complaint because the notice failed to specify that the
appeal was being taken from that judgment as well as
*Rule 59(e) provides:
"A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later
than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
Rule 60 (b) provides in relevant part:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. . . . A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation. . . ."
2
Rule 73 (a) provides in relevant part:
"The running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion
made pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the
full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is
to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made
upon a timely motion under such rules . . . granting or denying a
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment . . . ."

FOMAN v. DAVIS.
178

181

Opinion of the Court.

from the orders denying the motions. Considering the
second notice of appeal, therefore, only as an appeal from
the denial by the District Court of the motions to vacate
and amend, the Court of Appeals held that there was
nothing in the record to show the circumstances which
were before the District Court for consideration in ruling
on those motions; consequently it regarded itself as precluded from finding any abuse of discretion in the refusal
of the court below to allow amendment.
The Court of Appeals' treatment of the motion to vacate as one under Rule 59 (e) was permissible, at least as
an original matter, and we will accept that characterization here. Even if this made the first notice of appeal
premature, we must nonetheless reverse for we believe the
Court of Appeals to have been in error in so narrowly
reading the second notice.
The defect in the second notice of appeal did not mislead or prejudice the respondent. With both notices of
appeal before it (even granting the asserted ineffectiveness of the first), the Court of Appeals should have
treated the appeal from the denial of the motions as an
effective, although inept, attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be vacated. Taking the two notices and
the appeal papers together, petitioner's intention to seek
review of both the dismissal and the denial of the motions
was manifest. Not only did both parties brief and argue
the merits of the earlier judgment on appeal, but petitioner's statement of points on which she intended to
rely on appeal, submitted to both respondent and the
court pursuant to rule, similarly demonstrated the intent
to challenge the dismissal.
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere
technicalities. "The Federal Rules reject the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
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counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.,, Conley v. Gibson, 355
U. S. 41,48. The Rules themselves provide that they are
to be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 1.
The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment in order to allow amendment of the complaint. As
appears from the record, the amendment would have done
no more than state an alternative theory for recovery.
Rule 15 (a) declares that leave to amend "shall be
freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is
to be heeded. See generally, 3 Moore, Federal Practice
(2d ed. 1948),ffil15.08, 15.10. If the underlying facts or
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity
to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party
by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be "freely given." Of course, the grant or denial
of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave
without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is
not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that
discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal
Rules.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

FOMAN v. DAVIS.
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Memorandum of HARLAN, J.

Separate memorandum of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, in
which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins.
I agree with the Court as to the dismissal of petitioner's
appeal by the Court of Appeals. However, as to her
motion to vacate the order of the District Court and for
leave to amend the" complaint, I believe such matters are
best left with the Courts of Appeals, and I would dismiss
the writ of certiorari, in that respect, as improvidently
granted.
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conclusion is the same as the one that we
advance here:
[T]he court finds that federal statutes
and regulations pertaining to an interstate carrier's use of nonowned equipment do not render the carrier or its
insurer exclusively liable for personal injuries or property damage sustained in
an accident involving such equipment
Instead, federal law, as interpreted by
the Tenth Circuit, imposes liability on all
insurers who are obligated to provide
some type of coverage for damage pursuant to the terms of their policies and
any endorsements thereto. Under federal law, the insurer of an ICC-licensed
carrier is required to provide primary
coverage for any final judgment obtained
against the carrier. However, the mere
fact that an interstate carrier is involved
does not absolve other insurers from
their obligations under other policies
which are applicable to the claims.
Id at 569.
[7,8] We are in complete agreement
with the district court in American General, and adopt its reasoning:
[T]here is no reason that state laws or
private agreements should not be able to
allocate ultimate financial responsibility
in such a situation. Nor does public policy dictate that insurers of truck owners
be absolved from risks they voluntarily
assumed solely because the vehicle was
leased to an interstate carrier.
Id. at 565 (citations omitted). Similarly,
Empire may not escape liability that would
otherwise be primary simply because Guaranty's policy contains an ICC endorsement
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold that the effect of
the ICC endorsement in Guaranty's policy
is to negate limiting language in the body
of the policy, including any applicable "excess coverage" clause, but that the endorsement does not makes Guaranty's policy necessarily primary and supreme over
Empire's policy. Rather, once limiting language is read out of Guaranty's policy, the
two policies then must be compared pursuant to traditional state insurance and con-

tract law principles to determine how liability should be allocated. Accordingly, we
VACATE the summary judgment and REMAND for a determination of how the
risks should be allocated between Guaranty
and Empire when all the provisions of both
policies, including the ICC endorsement,
are considered.

Bonnie GLENN and Glenn's Enterprises
Inc., a Colorado Corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN GRAND
JUNCTION, a Federal Banking Institution, Allen E. Heimer, Wayne Beede,
and Carol Rodgers, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 87-1312.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1989.

Action was brought alleging RICO violation. The United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, Jim R. Carrigan, J., granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that
(1) district court was not required to sua
sponte allow amendment to the complaint,
and (2) complaint failed to state RICO
cause of action.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Civil Procedure *=>826
Trial court was not required to sua
sponte allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state claim for relief prior to dismissal.
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2. Federal Civil Procedure <*»824
Motion to dismiss for failure to state
claim was not responsive pleading, and
thus plaintiffs could have amended complaint as of right after they received such
motion and prior to trial court's decision.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.OA.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <*»849
Plaintiffs' request, in response to defendant's motion to dismiss, for leave to
amend complaint or file more definite statement with respect to particular areas court
believed they had failed to state claim for
relief, did not constitute motion for leave to
amend; court had not yet ruled on motion
to dismiss, and if plaintiffs had any
grounds for amending, they could have
amended as matter of right at time they
issued their request. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Commerce *=>82.72
Complaint failed to state RICO cause
of action; factual assertions were not
matched with elements of particular subsection of RICO statute, and allegations
were too vague and conclusory to state
claim for relief under RICO. 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1961-1968.
Submitted on the briefs: *
Bradley P. Pollock of Bell & Pollock,
P.C, Littleton, Colo., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Timothy P. Schimberg of Fowler &
Schimberg, P.C, of counsel, Thomas J. Bissell, and Jane E. Westbrook, Denver, Colo.,
for defendants-appellees.
Before LOGAN, BRORBY and
EBEL, Circuit Judges.
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and the bank officers hereinafter are referred to as Appellees.) Appellants asserted a violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984), and five
pendent claims. Appellees filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.
Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Appellants filed a response to this motion, asking
the trial court to require the defendants to
answer, or, in the alternative, "that leave
be given to the Plaintiffs to amend their
Complaint or file a more definite statement
with respect to those particular areas
where the Court believes and/or determines that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for relief."
Setting forth detailed reasons for its actions, the trial court dismissed the RICO
claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed the pendent claims for lack of jurisdiction. The order dismissing the complaint did not address Appellants' "request
to amend" contained in their response to
the motion to dismiss. Following the trial
court's dismissal, Appellants did not file a
motion for leave to amend under Fed.R.
Civ.P. 15, nor a motion to alter or amend
the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), nor
a motion for relief from a judgment for
mistake under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), nor any
other motion. Rather, Appellants chose to
appeal. Appellants assert the trial court
erred in not allowing them to amend their
complaint They assert further error in
the trial court's refusal to review the introductory allegations contained in their complaint in order to match them with the
elements of a RICO claim. We AFFIRM
the decision of the trial court
I

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, Bonnie Glenn and Glenn's Enterprises, Inc. (Appellants), filed a complaint against the bank; two of the officers
of the bank; and a guarantor. (The bank

[1] Appellants state their first issue as
follows: "Did the court error [sic] in its
failure to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint to state a claim for relief
prior to dismissing the Bubject case and

•After examining the briefs and the appellate
record, this panel has unanimously determined
that oral argument would not materially assist
the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.

App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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complaint?" Appellants contend that they
moved for leave to amend and erroneously
were denied that permission. In our view,
no such motion was before the court Appellants failed to exercise their right to
amend prior to the trial court's decision,
and also failed to move for leave to amend
after the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, in conjunction with a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
or Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Because the district
judge was not obliged to consider the matter, he committed no error.
[2] Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that a
party may amend its pleadings once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Recognized
pleadings are listed in Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) as
a complaint, an answer, a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such, an answer to
a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, and a
third-party answer. "No other pleading
shall be allowed." Id Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss is not deemed a responsive
pleading. Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d
27, 29 (10th Cir.1985). Consequently, Appellants could have amended as of right
after they received the motion to dismiss
and prior to the trial court's decision. Appellants failed to exercise their right to
amend and chose instead to stand on their
complaint
After the court granted the motion to
dismiss, Appellants could have amended
their complaint only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party. Fed.
R.Civ.P. 15(a); O'Bryan v. Chandler, 852
F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir.1965), cert denied*
884 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct 1444, 16 L.Ed.2d 580
(1966). Appellants could have filed a motion under Rule 15(a) in conjunction with a
motion to amend the judgment under Fed.
R.Civ.P. 59(e), or a motion for relief due to
mistake under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b), "[a]n application to the
court for an order shall be made by motion
which . . . shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the
relief or order sought" Id. Appellants
failed to file any motion.
[8] In response to the Appellees' motion
to dismiss, Appellants requested that the

court require the Appellees to answer, or,
in the alternative, "that leave be given to
the Plaintiffs [Appellants] to amend their
Complaint or file a more definite statement
with respect to those particular areas
where the Court believes and/or determines that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for relief." Appellants urge
us to construe this request, made prior to
the dismissal, as a motion for leave to
amend. We decline to do so. In our view,
Appellants' request does not rise to the
status of a motion. The request is not an
application for an order contemplated under the rules, and the request states no
grounds let alone "particular" grounds for
the request If Appellants had any
grounds for amending, they could have
amended as a matter of right at the time
they issued their request Obviously, either they had no additional facts or they
felt they had stated a claim.
Appellants could not file a request for
leave to amend without first complying
with Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Rule 11 requires
that the signature of an attorney on a
pleading certify to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after reasonable inquiry, that the pleading
is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good-faith argument
for a change in the law. Furthermore,
Rule 11 contemplates and demands an attorney's investigation of both the facts and
the law, and this cannot be done when the
attorney, as here, apparently does not
know what is necessary to state a claim.
Rule 11 applies to motions. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1191
at 84 (1971). The premature request for
leave to amend was without basis and was
a mere "shot in the dark." There could be
no compliance with Rule 11 until Appellants first ascertained what was necessary
to state a claim.
Because the issue was never before it,
the district court did not refuse to permit
Appellants to amend their complaint For
the same reason, we will not construe the
court's silence as an implicit denial of a
motion.
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Appellants next urge us to grant leave to
amend as a matter of right after dismissal
as a "request" therefor was made prior to
the court's dismissal. We cannot agree.
If Appellants' theory were to be adopted,
the pleading phase of a lawsuit would never end. Such a practice would undermine
the distinctions in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 between
"right" to amend and 'leave" to amend,
and plaintiffs' counsel would then have the
right to amend indefinitely simply by including a "request to amend" in their response to a motion to disriiss.
Under the facts of this case, we hold that
Appellant did not move the court for leave
to amend the complaint and therefore the
district judge committed no error in not
ruling thereon. A naked request for leave
to amend asked for as alternative relief
when a party has the unexercised right to
amend is not sufficient. After a motion to
dismiss has been granted, plaintiffs must
first reopen the case pursuant to a motion
under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) and then file
a motion under Rule 15, and properly apply
to the court for leave to amend by means
of a motion which in turn complies with
Rule 7. In that event, in accordance with
Rule 15, "leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." Id; Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct 227, 230, 9
LEd.2d 222 (1962). Furthermore, this
court has allowed the plaintiff ten days
after dismissal to amend the complaint
Eames v. City of Logan, 762 F.2d 83, 85
(10th Cir.1985); Leggett v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436, 438 (10th Cir.
1949). Appellants availed themselves of
none of their legal options. Appellants'
failures are well beyond "mere technicalities" and this court will not protect them
from their own inaction.
II
[4] Appellants state their second issue
as follows: "Did the court error [sic] in its
refusal to review the introductory allegations to determine if said allegations are
sufficient to state a claim for relief?" The
trial court reviewed all of Appellants' alle1. Rohler was miscited as "576 V2& 1260 (CAJth
1978)." We located the case at 576 F^d 1260

gations and liberally construed the complaint The trial judge described Appellants' method of pleading as "shotgun"
pleading and stated that he was not going
to do Appellants' work for them to connect
assertions with elements of all sections of
the RICO law. Most importantly, the trial
court found the allegations "too vague and
conclusory to stale a claim for relief under
RICO." The trial court's order of January
16, 1987, thoroughly analyzed the RICO
claim and concluded in part:
Plaintiffs have failed to state the facts
that support the elements of their RICO
claim within the allegations of their First
Claim for Relief. I will not search
through the several paragraphs of the
plaintiffs' "Introductory Allegations"
and attempt to match the factual assertions with the elements of all subsections
of the RICO statute to determine if the
complaint states a claim for relief. Neither will I require the defendants to
"piece" together the plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs are required to assert,
in good faith and subject to Rule 11,
Fed.R.Civ.P. the RICO subsection or subsections on which they rely and support
each claim with allegations of fact.
Moreover, the plaintiffs' allegations
are too vague and conclusory to state a
claim under RICO.
The law recognizes a significant difference
between notice pleading and "shotgun"
pleading.
Apparently, even Appellants do not contend their purported RICO claim was sufficient. They neither contend nor establish
in their brief that this "pleading" sets forth
a claim as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Appellants cite two unpersuasive cases in support of their contentions on this issue: New
York State Waterways Ass'n, Inc. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.1972), and Rohler v. TRW, Inc., "576 F.2d 1260 (C.A.7th
1978)."1 In New York State Waterways,
the court held that "it is our duty to read
[the complaint] liberally, to determine
whether the facts set forth justify taking
jurisdiction...." 469 F.2d at 421. In our
case, the record indicates that the court did
(7th Cir. 1978), and note that Rohler was not the
only case miscited by appellants in their brief.
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in fact liberally construe the complaint
The trial court's meticulous order recites in
part as follows: "Plaintiffs have attempted
to set forth the details of their action in the
'Introductory Allegations' section of their
complaint Liberally construing the complaint, it appears that
" Furthermore,
Appellants' second issue is not a liberal
construction issue, but whether the trial
court was obligated to construct a cause of
action from allegations in a complaint filed
by a party who was unwilling or unable to
plead the cause of action himself. Consequently, New York State Waterways does
not apply to this case.
Likewise, Rohler is distinguishable. In
Rohler, the court dismissed the complaint,
but piamtiff filed a motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint, complete with a proposed amended
complaint The trial court denied permission to amend. The circuit court reversed,
holding the court must grant leave to
amend to allow plaintiff to attempt to comply with the jurisdictional requirement In
tins case, however, Appellants filed no motion for leave to amend, and they neither
conceived nor produced a proposed amended complaint Consequently, Rohler is distinguishable from this case on the facts.
Although Appellants did not designate
the complaint as part of the record on
appeal, we have obtained a copy of the
complaint in accordance with 10th Cir.R.
10.2.4. After reviewing the record as supplemented by us, we conclude the trial
court did not err in refusing to attempt to
create order out of chaos. The complaint
failed to state a claim under any conceivable matching of allegations.
Because Appellants neither made a showing in accordance with Rule 11 that they
were able to amend and state a claim, nor
filed a motion in accordance with Rule 7
showing with particularity the grounds
therefor, we will not direct Appellants be
given an opportunity to amend. The complaint failed to state a claim. The decision
of the trial court as set forth in its order of
January 16, 1987 is AFFIRMED.

Karen L. HOKANSEN, fka Karen L. Neil;
Cecile Lou Browning, heir-at-law and
next of kin of Aimee Uffner, deceased
minor, Cecile Lou Browning, Successor
To Randall J. Price, Special Administrator of the Estate of Aimee Uffner,
deceased; Amalia R. Zapata; and Amalia R Zapata, Plaintiffs/Appellants,
•.

UNITED STATES of America,
Defendant/Appellee.
Nos. 86-2136, 86-2137, 86-2139
and 86-2140.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit
Feb. 16, 1989.

Victim of shooting and representatives
of deceased victims brought Federal Tort
Claims Act action against United States
alleging that Veterans Administration hospital negligently breached duty to victims
to prevent release of voluntary psychiatric
inpatient because he had known general
history of mental and emotional problems
which included violent tendencies. The
United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Sam A. Crow, J., dismissed
action. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Stephen H. Anderson, Circuit
Judge, held that hospital did not have duty
under Kansas law not to release voluntary
patient, and thus, hospital could not be held
liable for damages.
Affirmed.
Holloway, Chief Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

1. Mental Health *»414(3)
Under Kansas law, Veterans Administration hospital did not have duty to prevent release of voluntary psychiatric inpatient on basis of known general history of
mental and emotional problems which in-
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[3] A number of public policy concerns conclude that in the circumstances presentunderlie the need for grand jury secrecy.1 ed, the examination by Dr. Chadwick of
Disclosure of certain grand jury materials grand jury materials was proper and the
to Dr. Chadwick to enable him to express district court did not abuse its discretion by
his expert opinion concerning the cause of authorizing such disclosure under Rule 6(e).
[4] Mayes's motion to dismiss the indictthe child's death to the grand jury in no
ment
because only eleven grand jurors atway contravened any of these policies. The
tended
every session raises an issue whose
government could have familiarized Dr.
resolution
is controlled by United States v.
Chadwick with the facts surrounding the
Leverage
Funding
Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d
child's death by posing a complex hypotheti645
(9th
Cir.
1980).
cal question. In the circumstances presentAFFIRMED.
ed, this approach would have been unduly
cumbersome. The most expeditious and reliable way for Dr. Chadwick to prepare for
O I «YNUMBER SYSUM>
his expert testimony was to review transcripts of the testimony of prior grand jury
witnesses and examine other evidence
presented to the grand jury. Since he exMilton MENDE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
amined these materials under court superviv.
sion, sufficient safeguards existed to prevent abuse of the procedure.
DUN & BRADSTREET, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Additionally, Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(eX3XCXi)
No. 80-5711.
provides that a court may order disclosure
of grand jury materials "preliminarily to or
United States Court of Appeals,
in connection with a judicial proceeding."
Ninth Circuit.
We need not decide whether a grand jury
Argued and Submitted Jan. 7, 1982.
proceeding is "a judicial proceeding" under
Decided Feb. 25, 1982.
Rule 6(e), as it seems clear that grand jury
proceedings are at least preliminary to a
judicial proceeding. United States v. StanPlaintiff brought suit seeking damages
ford, 589 FJ2d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 1978).2 We and injunctive relief from defendant for
1. Reasons for grand jury secrecy are stated in
United States v. Proctor and Gamble, 356 U.S.
677, 681-682 n.6, 78 S.Ct. 983, 985-986 n.6, 2
L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), quoting United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-629 (3rd Cir. 1954):
"(1) To prevent the escape of those whose
indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure
the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to
indictment or their friends from importuning
the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of
perjury or tampering with the witnesses who
may testify before grand jury and later appear
at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by
persons who have information with respecj to
the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial
where there was no probability of guilt."
2. Citing United States v. Tager, 638 FJ2d 167
(10th Cir. 1980), Mayes maintains that disclosure, under judicial supervision, of certain
ffOFJd-S

grand jury materials to Dr. Chadwick was improper under Rule 6(eX3)(CX0. Tager involved the propriety of a subsection (CX0 disclosure of grand jury materials to a private,
nongovernmental investigator to enable him
further to assist governmental attorneys in an
ongoing investigation. The court noted that a
governmental attorney's need for assistance in
the enforcement of federal criminal law is addressed, not by subsection (C)(i), but by subsection (A)(ii) of Rule 6(e) which limits disclosure to "government personnel." 638 F2d at
170. Without expressing a view as to the correctness of the Tager decision, we note that Dr.
Chadwick was not called upon to assist governmental attorneys as a private investigator in an
ongoing investigation, but was asked to express his expert medical opinion based in part
on certain evidence previously presented to the
grand jury. As such Dr. Chadwick's expert
testimony before the grand jury did not come
within the provisions of subsection (A)(ii).
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alleged improper consumer credit reporting
pursuant to California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. Action was filed in
state court and removed to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, which Court, Terry J.
Hatter, Jr., J., granted summary judgment
against plaintiff, and plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Ferguson, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs
motion to file amended complaint; (2) commercial credit report published by defendant was not a "consumer credit report"
within meaning of the California Act; and
(3) defendant was not a "consumer credit
reporting agency" under the California Act.
Affirmed.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <e=>828
Federal Courts «=>817
Allowance of leave to amend lies within discretion of trial court and is reviewable
only for abuse of discretion.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>830, 832
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying plaintiff's motion to file amended complaint, in view of plaintiff's delay in
answering interrogatories as ordered by the
court, 25-month delay between filing of initial complaint and motion to amend, discovery of no new facts, revival of some
previously used theories, and further preparation that admission of new causes would
require.
3. Consumer Credit *=»16
Credit information published by defendant concerning business entities or individuals engaged in business in their business capacities, and not as consumers was
not a "consumer credit report" within
meaning of California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, as would subject defendant to liability for disseminating false
or obsolete information about consumer.
•Honorable Stanley A Weigel, United States
Distnct Judge, Northern District of California,

West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1785(c) (Repealed).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Consumer Credit e»16
Defendant which published credit information concerning business entities or
individuals engaged in business in their
business capacities, and not as consumers,
was not a "consumer credit reporting agency" under California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, as would subject defendant to liability for disseminating false
or obsolete information about consumer.
West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.3(d).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
Michael J. Schwartz, Law Offices of Michael J. Schwartz, Canoga Park, Cal., for
plaintiff-appellant.
Edwin Freston, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for defendant-appellee; Lew W.
Cramer, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of California.
Before PREGERSON and FERGUSON,
Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL,* District
Judge.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
In 1978, plaintiff Mende filed a complaint
against defendant Dun & Bradstreet in the
state superior court. A month later the
complaint was removed to federal district
court under diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs complaint sought damages and injunctive relief from Dun & Bradstreet for alleged improper consumer credit reporting
pursuant to the California Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act, Cal.Civ.Code
§ 1785 et seq Plaintiff's four causes of
action were for (1) reporting obsolete credit
sitting by designation
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information, (2) reporting inaccuracies in
consumer reports, (3) failure to reinvestigate or delete inaccurate or unverifiable
information, and (4) an injunction against
the issuance of defendant's reports.
Dun & Bradstreet filed an answer denying, inter alia, that it had an obligation to
comply with the pertinent sections of the
California Consumer Credit Reporting
Agencies Act ("California Act").
Dun & Bradstreet subsequently filed an
amended answer that did not raise any new
defenses but that included a counterclaim
for attorneys' fees. On June 10, 1980, the
district court granted a motion of defendant for an order compelling plaintiff to
answer interrogatories and for attorneys'
fees in the amount of $300.
Three days later, plaintiff filed a notice
of a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. Plaintiffs proposed amended
complaint added new theories based on federal statutes, the United States Constitution, libel and negligence laws.
Defendant filed various affidavits in support of its motion for summary judgment
The district court denied plaintiff's motion
to amend his complaint and granted summary judgment against plaintiff. The district court concluded that Dun & Bradstreet
is not a business entity within the provisions of the California Act and, in particular, is not a "consumer credit reporting
agency" within the meaning of the Act.
This appeal presents two issues:
1. Was it an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny plaintiffs motion
to file an amended complaint?
2. Did the district court properly grant
summary judgment against plaintiff?
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
[1] The allowance of leave to amend lies
within the discretion of the trial court and
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is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Izaak Walton League of America v.
St Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974). See
also Kirby v. P. R Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d
904, 912 (7th Cir. 1973). The only question
here is whether the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend.
[2] In the instant case, the complaint
was filed in federal court on April 24, 1978.
The plaintiff filed a notice of a motion for
leave to amend on June 13,1980, 25 months
after the original complaint. The amended
complaint is brought only to assert new
theories, not because any new facts came to
plaintiff's attention. It is worth noting
that the amended complaint was filed three
days after the court ordered plaintiff to
answer interrogatories, to deliver them to
defendant no later than July 25, 1980, and
to pay defendant $300 in attorney's fees.
Thus, the court apparently believed there
had been undue delay even before plaintiff
filed his amended complaint. It is also
noteworthy that plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against defendant in 1966 asserting causes
of action for libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and interference with business relationships.1 In view of plaintiffs delay in
answering interrogatories, the 25-month delay between the filing of the initial complaint and the motion to amend, the discovery of no new facts, the revival of some
previously used theories, and the further
preparation that the admission of new causes would require, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend.
HI. DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
Plaintiff argues that two genuine issues
of material fact stood in the way of summary judgment: (A) Whether Dun & Bradstreet reports are consumer credit reports,
and (B) whether Dun & Bradstreet is a

1. Plaintiff did not inform the court below that
Action No 885 836 (filed May, 1966), which
some of the issues in the proposed amended
was dismissed for failure to timely amend.
complaint had been raised 14 years earlier in
Dun & Bradstreet was also named as a defendMende v. Union, Los Angeles Supenor Court ant in that case.
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consumer credit reporting agency. The significance of these question is that an affirmative answer to each could subject Dun
& Bradstreet to liability under the California Act for disseminating false or obsolete
information about a consumer.
A. The Dun & Bradstreet Reports in
Issue Are Not Consumer Credit Reports Within the Meaning of the California Act.
The California Act defines a "consumer
credit report" as:
any written,oral, or other communication
of any information by a consumer credit
reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, or
credit capacity, which is used or is expected to be used, or collected in whole or in
part, for the purpose of serving as a
factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for: (1) credit to be used primarily for personal family or household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3)
other purposes authorized in Section
1785.11.
Cal.Civ.Code § 1785(c) No California case
construes the term "consumer credit report" in the California Act; the parties
therefore have examined the construction
of the virtually identical phrase "consumer
report" in the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("Federal Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq. The legislative history of the Federal
Act supports the proposition that the definition does not cover business credit reports.
S.Rep.No. 91-517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) (Committee on Banking & Currency).
Defendant maintains that the Dun &
Bradstreet Reports relate to the business
entities in which plaintiff participated.
Moreover, defendant has filed affidavits to
the effect that it only provides credit information concerning business entities or individuals engaged in their business capacities.
The affidavits indicate that Dun & Bradstreet has not prepared consumer reports
since 1974. Dun & Bradstreet also requires
that its subscribers sign an agreement that
they will use reports on businesses only as a

basis for credit to businesses in their capacity as such.
The instant case is like Wrigley v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 375 F.Supp. 969 (W.D.Ga.1974),
in which the court granted summary judgment against Wrigley on the following findings and conclusions:
. .. The Court finds that the undisputed
facts of the instant action are that Dun &
Bradstreet issued its credit report on
Wrigley Construction Co. for Dun &
Bradstreet subscribers to use in deciding
whether to extend commercial credit to
Wrigley Construction Co. It is therefore
clear that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
would not ordinarily apply to the credit
report issues on Wrigley Construction Co.
*
*
*
*
*
*
. . . Dun & Bradstreet issued a credit
rej>ort on Wrigley Construction Co. which
contained information on the personal financial situation of Mr. Wrigley. The
credit report issued was for the extension
of commercial credit and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act therefore does not apply.
Accordingly, the Court grants Dun &
Bradstreet's motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 970, 971 (footnote omitted).
Mende filed no competent evidence in the
trial court opposing the Dun & Bradstreet
affidavits. He made no showing whatsoever that the reports were used for consumer
purposes. The trial court properly used the
affidavits to find that there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Dun &
Bradstreet issued a consumer credit report
"The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see
whether there is a genuine issue of fact."
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,
Fed.RCiv.Proc. 56(e).
[3] Plaintiff suggests that the reports
here at issue "could" have been used as
consumer credit reports, and on that basis
argues for the application of the very expansive definition of consumer credit report
in Belshaw v. Credit Bureau of Prescott,

MENDE v. DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.
OteuS?0F.2d 12» (1982)

392 F.Supp. 1356 (D.Ariz.1975).2 Belshaw
held that
"consumer report" must be interpreted to
mean any report made by a credit reporting agency of information that could be
used for one of the purposes enumerated
in § 1681a.
Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in the original).
The Belshaw definition depends on whether
information could be used for certain purposes, not on whether it is collected for
certain purposes. This expansive interpretation of consumer report has been criticized as bringing "within the coverage of
the Act any gathering of information about
an individual, even if the context were such
clearly non-consumer activities as engagement in profit-making transactions . . . or
litigation against a defendant whose insurer
requests a report
" Henry v. Forbes,
433 F.Supp. 5, 9 n.5 (D.Minn.1976).
Here there was no evidence that the reports were used for any other purpose than
their intended purpose as commercial credit
reports. We do not believe that the mere
fact that a report could be used as a consumer report is enough to make it one.
More is required; however, we reserve the
question of just what additional showing is
required until a case properly presents the
issue.
In passing, we note that the present case
is very different from Beresh v. Retail
Credit Co., 358 F.Supp. 260 (C.D.Cal.1973).
Beresh held that reports prepared by a consumer-reporting agency for the purpose of
determining whether an insured was disabled, and purportedly used by the insurer
for the purpose of terminating monthly
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payments, were "consumer reports" within
the meaning of the Federal Act. The court
reasoned that the reports were consumer
reports within the meaning of the Federal
Act because they were used "in connection
with a business transaction involving a consumer." 358 F.Supp. at 262. In Beresh,
there was no dispute that the credit agency
was a "consumer reporting agency" within
the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
Second, Beresh was a consumer who had
bought personal insurance. In contrast,
Dun & Bradstreet disputes that it is a consumer reporting agency. Moreover, Dun &
Bradstreet claims that its reports relate to
Mende only in his business capacity, not his
individual consumer capacity. Thus, Beresh
is clearly distinguishable.
B. Dun & Bradstreet Is Not a Consumer
Credit Reporting Agency.
[4] The California Act defines "consumer credit reporting agency" to mean
any person who, for monetary fees, dues,
or on a cooperative non-profit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .
Cal.Civ.Code § 1785.3(d). As discussed
above in subpart III(A), Dun & Bradstreet
affidavits show that its credit information
concerns business entities or individuals engaged in business in their business capacities, and not as consumers. On the basis of
these affidavits, it appears that Dun &

2. Belshaw is easily distinguishable on its face
First, if an individual chooses to do busifrom the present case and from other cases
ness as a corporation in order to limit his
that have applied more restrictive interpretaliability, he must not expect the same degree
tions to the Federal Act. Indeed, Belshaw exof privacy as other individuals when applying
pressly distinguished previous cases, including
for credit. He could apply for credit as an
Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F.Supp. individual and retain the protection of the
969 (N.D.Ga.1974), that had construed the FedAct if he wishes. Second, in each of these
eral Act more narrowly:
cases, the individual was aware that his comIn those cases the Act was construed as not
pany had applied for credit or insurance and
applicable to reports made by credit reportmight be investigated.
ing agencies on individuals where a corpora392 F.Supp. at 1360. The report in Belshaw
tion or business in which the individual was a
was made with respect to the plaintiff as an
principal had applied for credit or insurance.
individual consumer; the Dun & Bradstreet reThose cases are readily distinguishable from
ports in the instant case are made with respect
the present case in two respects.
to Mende in his business capacity.
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Bradstreet is not a consumer credit report- ern District of California, William W
ing agency. Under the Federal Act, if a Schwarzer, J., dismissed action, and wife
reporting entity is not a consumer reporting and children appealed. The Court of Apagency within the meaning of the Act, then peals, Lucas, District Judge, sitting by dessuch entity cannot be held to have violated ignation, held that action, in which all rethe statute, and dismissal is required. Bel- covery hinged on determination of marital
shaw v. Credit Bureau ofPrescott, supra, at status, was within historic domestic rela1361. The same result should follow under tions exception to diversity jurisdiction, and
the California Act
thus District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over dispute.
CONCLUSION
Order vacated and action dismissed for
First the district court did not abuse its
lack of jurisdiction.
discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to
amend his complaint. Second, the district
court properly granted summary judgment 1. Federal Courts e=»30, 622
because there was no genuine issue of maLack of subject-matter jurisdiction can
terial fact. Defendant's affidavits, which be raised on court's own motion at any
were not controverted by any affidavits or time, and can be raised for first time on
other evidentiary material filed by Mende, appeal.
were sufficient to show that Dun & Bradstreet does not issue consumer credit re- 2. Federal Courts <s=>8, 284
ports and that it is not a consumer credit
Domestic relations cases are within the
reporting agency within the meaning of the Article III judicial power of the federal
California Act.
courts, but outside power bestowed by Congress in diversity statute 28 U.S.C.A.
AFFIRMED.
§ 1332(a)(2); U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 3, § 1 et
seq.
O
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Marcella CSIBI, Ludovic Csibi, Aurora
Csibi and Maria Csibi,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Gizela FUSTOS, etc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 81-4100.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 14, 1981.
Decided Feb. 26, 1982.
Action was brought by decedent's alleged first wife and her children to estal>lish their rights in decedent's estate. The
United States District Court for the North-

3. Federal Courts <s=»284
States have interest in family relations
superior to that of federal government, and
state courts have more expertise in field of
domestic relations, and thus no federal diversity subject-matter jurisdiction exists
over domestic disputes.
28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(a)(2).
4. Federal Courts <*=>47
Federal courts may exercise their discretion to abstain from deciding cases in
which domestic relations problems are involved tangentially to other issues determinative of case. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(aX2).
5. Federal Courts e=»284
Where case turned on marital status of
decedent and his alleged first and second
wives, where first wife had to establish her
own status as decedent's legal spouse and
disprove second wife's status as good faith
putative spouse in order to recover, and
where part of first wife's prayer for relief
was request for annulment of second mar-

862

587 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

careful and explicit on this subject If the
ALT rejected such evidence then he would Gordon D. MERTENS, Sr., and Marcella
have dealt with this subject in an explicit
Mertens, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
fashion. Gee v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 849
v.
(7th Cir. 1966); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F^d
299 (4th Cir. 1968); Cutler v. Weinberger, Ralph HUMMELL, Individually and as
Chief of Police of Barrington Hills et
616 FM 1282 (2d Cir. 1975).
aL, Defendants-Appellees.
The comment in Cutler v. Weinberger,
616 TM 1282,1286 (2d Cir. 1975), has pointNo. 77-1734.
ed application here:
United States Court of Appeals,
"While the determination of another
Seventh Circuit.
governmental agency that a social security disability benefits claimant is disabled
Argued June 14, 1978.
is not binding on the Secretary, it is entiDecided
Aug. 21, 1978.'
tled to some weight and should be conOpinion Nov. 17, 1978.
sidered. See Robinson v. Richardson, 360
F.Supp. 243, 249 (E.D.N.Y.1973); Zimbalist v. Richardson, 334 F.Supp. 1350, 1355
(E.D.N.Y.1971); Pendergraph v. CeleAppeal was taken in a civil action from
brezze, 255 F.Supp. 313, 321 (M.D.N.C. an order of the United States District Court
1966)."
for the Northern District of Illinois, Ber[11] The principles announced by this nard M. Decker, J., dismissing the suit for
Court in Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d noncompliance by plaintiffs with pretrial
712 (7th Cir. 1976), and Daniels v. Mathews, discovery orders and denying leave to file a
567 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977), requires the third amended complaint. The Court of
remand of this case to give the Secretary an Appeals held that the trial court's actions
opportunity to consider and make findings did not involve abuse of discretion.
on the subject of the state's separate deterAffirmed.
mination of disability.
Again on this issue, even minimal advocacy would suggest arguing for the decision
by the Secretary to be consistent with the
state's separate determination of disability.
On remand such will be possible.
On remand, the claimant must be given
an opportunity to develop evidence relating
to her total physical and mental problems,
including obesity and mental illness, as the
same may bear on the question of disability.
Therefore, the decision of the District
Court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with
this order.

Federal Civil Procedure *»839, 1741
No abuse of discretion was involved in
trial court's action in refusing to permit
plaintiffs in civil action to file third amended complaint and in dismissing suit on
ground that plaintiffs had failed to comply
with prediscovery orders. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proa rule 37(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.Ct. of
App. 7tb Cir. Rule 35, 28 U.S.C.A.

Eliot A. Landau, Woodridge, 111., for
plaintiffs-appellants.
James R. Schirott, David R. Novoselsky,
Chicago, III, for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS, SPRECHER and
BAUER, Circuit Judges.

* This appeal was originally decided by unreported order on August 21, 1978 See Circuit Rule

35. The court has subsequently decided to
issue the decision as an opinion.
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PER CURIAM.
The court, having read the briefs, addressed itself to the record, and heard oral
arguments, finds no abuse of discretion and
no violation of constitutional rights in the
lower court's order dismissing the appellants' case under Rule 37(b) for noncompliance with pre-trial discovery orders. Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the
lower court's denial of leave to file a third
amended complaint.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in
the district court's memorandum opinion,,
that opinion is affirmed and adopted as the
opinion of this court Costs are awarded to
the appellees.

said occurrence, persons present before or
after said occurrence, persons who have
knowledge of said occurrence, persons
who have knowledge of the allegations of
the plaintiffs' complaint and persons who
have knowledge concerning the plaintiffs'
physical or mental condition before, during and after the said occurrence."
The record indicates that the defendants
repeated their insistence upon compliance
with this discovery request by letter and
orally at various depositions.

Since the filing of this discovery request,
there have been repeated court orders compelling the plaintiffs' compliance. On January 26, 1977, this court ordered "plaintiff to
AFFIRMED.
produce records to defendants." On FebruIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
ary 11, 1977, Magistrate Balog ordered
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
"[p]laintiff
to produce all documents on DeEASTERN DIVISION
fendant's outstanding notice to produce inNO 75 C 88
cluding . . . a list of all potential
GORDON MERTEXS, SR, et a/,
witnesses who have given statements". On
Plaintiff,
March 3, 1977, the magistrate ordered
v
"that if the plaintiffs are claiming that
RALPH HUMMELL, et &1
any of the statements, transcriptions, recDefendants
ords, notes, memoranda or other docuMEMORANDUM OPINION
ments of interviews with witnesses, as
There is pending before the court a morequested in paragraph 5 of the Novemtion by certain defendants in this case to
ber 10, 1976 request for production, are
dismiss the instant action pursuant to F.R.
privileged from discovery, that the plainCiv.P. 37(bX2XC) and 37(d)
tiffs produce all such statements, tranThis motion accords with the report of
scriptions, records, notes, memoranda or
Magistrate Balog, dated April 6, 1977,
other documents of interviews with witwhich recommended that the action be disnesses to this court for an in-camera inmissed. The magistrate's report noted that
spection
for further disposition by this
the plaintiffs had failed to comply with
court."
(Emphasis
added.)
several orders to produce discovery materials. Magistrate Balog also commented that
The plaintiffs acknowledge the entry of
the plaintiffs had failed to comply with an these orders but maintain that they have
order to prepare a first draft of the final
complied with them. Their counsel conpretrial order for this case.
cedes that he never submitted the list of
On November 10, 1976, the defendants potential witnesses' statements but mainfiled a request to produce certain materials. tains this was "due to the fact that no such
This included a request (No. 5) for
statements existed} [Emphasis in origi"[a]ny and all statements, transcriptions, nal.] That further, the only memoranda or
records, notes, memoranda or other docu- notes available to the Plaintiffs' attorneys
ments of interviews with witnesses to the were notes of the personal communications
1. Counsel for the plaintiffs asserts that, although various witnesses have been contacted,
no statements, notes or memoranda relating to

these contracts have ever been reduced to writing during the entire 28 month period during
which this litigation has been pending
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with the Plaintiffs, which were not the
subject of Defendants' paragraph 5 of their
Request for Production."
It is apparently agreed by the parties
that an attorney from plaintiffs' counsel's
office represented to the magistrate on
February 11,1977, that their office did possess certain notes, but asserted that they
were privileged and exempt from discovery.
Plaintiffs* lead counsel, who was not
present on this occasion asserts that his
associate had advised the court that these
notes were limited to statements made by
the plaintiffs. There is no supporting affidavit from Mr. Pellegrini, the associate who
made the disputed representation. Defendants' counsel, who was present in court on
February 11th, maintains under oath that
Pellegrini "stated in open court that the
plaintiffs did have memoranda of interviews with witnesses as sought in paragraph 5." It is also evident that Magistrate
Balog was neither persuaded that the materials admittedly in plaintiffs' possession
were privileged, nor that plaintiffs did not
have materials covered by the discovery
request. Thus, he entered on that day the
order requiring production of a list of potential witnesses who had given statements,
and later required an in camera inspection

prior to a determination of the existence of
any privilege.
In any event, there can be no dispute that
the plaintiff never complied with the order
to supply a written list of witnesses who
have given statements.* Their current denial of the existence of any such witnesses
is not sufficient to comply with the magistrate orders.1
Furthermore, the magistrate expressly
stated that he reserved the ultimate determination of the validity of any claimed
privilege for notes or statements in the
possession of the plaintiffs. There is no
dispute that plaintiffs did not submit the
notes of plaintiffs' statements in their possession for an in camera inspection, as mandated by the March 3rd order. The court
therefore finds that it must sustain the
magistrate's finding that the plaintiffs have
failed to comply with the orders regarding
the production of records.4
Finally, there appears to be no dispute
that the plaintiffs have failed to comply
with the order to prepare a first draft of
the final pretrial order.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court to enter an order dismissing
the action as a sanction where "a party fails
to obey an order to provide or permit discovery." F.R.Civ.P. 37(bX2XC). Rule 41(b)

2. The plaintiffs apparently never furnished any
written explanation of their position (i. e. that
they had never reduced any statement or contact with witnesses to writing) until after the
magistrate had found that their conduct merited dismissal. Had they made these representations in a timely fashion to the magistrate he
would have been able to fashion discovery orders which took these circumstances into consideration. (£. g. he might have required the
plaintiffs to compile a list of all witnesses who
had been previously contacted and to submit a
detailed summary of the testimony that each
witness would give if called at trial.) By choosing to ignore the discovery requests and the
court orders without explanation, the plaintiffs
obstructed the ability of the magistrate to perform his functions.

On January 21, 1977, plaintiffs' counsel responded to a request for this paragraph 5 material by saying, "We will review what statements that we may have on this, and we'll
advise you by Tuesday as to any statements,
transcriptions, or notes other than attorney's
notes that fall within the purview of paragraph
No. 5."
As late as March 25, 1977, plaintiffs' counsel
was still promising to "comply with paragraphs
5, 10 and 11 in more elaborate style."
Neither statement fits in well with the assertion
made in court by plaintiffs' counsel that the
consistent practice of his office had been to
avoid reducing to writing any information provided by witnesses. Assuming that counsel
was aware of this practice of his own office,
these statements must be viewed as extremely
evasive.

3. The statements and conduct of plaintiffs'
counsel appear to contradict the argument that
counsel had consistently and unambiguously
denied possessing any statements, memoranda,
or notes of interviews with witnesses.

4. The possibility that the plaintiffs have by now
expended over $24,000 in legal fees and expenditures in this case is, of course, utterly
without relevance to the matter of counsel's
compliance with the orders of the court.
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provides for the dismissal of an action
where the plaintiff has failed to comply
with "any order of the court." Dismissal is,
of course, an extremely harsh sanction.
The instant case, however, provides a rare
example of a situation in which such a
sanction is in fact merited. A review of the
extensive docket sheet in this case, a copy
of which is attached hereto, underscores the
difficulties which this case has already created. The conduct of the plaintiffs has
already necessitated the order referring this
case to a magistrate. By that order, dated
December 22, 1976, Magistrate Balog was
given "the power to impose appropriate
sanctions upon any party who fails to fully
cooperate with the magistrate in the formulation of the pretrial order, or who in any
other way fails to comply with the instant
order."
A careful consideration of the record in
this case, including the briefs of the parties
and the exhibits introduced with respect to
the instant motion to dismiss, persuades the
court that Magistrate Balog was well justified in recommending the dismissal of the
instant complaint with prejudice.
The plaintiffs have also sought leave to
file their "third amended complaint," as
well as a commensurate extension of time
for discovery.
Under F.R.CW.P. 15(a) a party is entitled
to only one amended pleading as a matter
of course. Subsequent amendments are
permitted "only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party." The
determination of the appropriateness of additional amended pleadings "is within the
discretion" of the trial court. Fom&n v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9
L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (dictum), cited in Zenith
5. The original complaint was filed on January
10, 1975. The first complaint was dismissed on
March 7, 1975. The first amended complaint
was dismissed on May 23, 1975. Plaintiffs
were denied leave to file a proffered second
amended complaint on October 15, 1975. The
instant second amended complaint was filed on
November 3, 1975, and plaintiffs were permitted to reinstate the Village of Barrington HiUs
as a party defendant on March 10, 1976. The
587 F26—19

Radio Corp, v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S.
321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971).
The court is aware that the spirit of the
rule is tolerant towards such amendments.
Rule 15(a) states that "leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." A trial
court is obligated to act in this spirit, and
may not deny such leave "without any justifying reason." Foman v. Davis, supra.
This does not mean, however, that the
right to amend is absolute. "The requirement of judicial approval suggests that
there are instances where leave should not
be granted." Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va.
Rwy. Co., 22 F.R.D. 252, 255 (W.D.Pa.1958).
Foman v. Davis states that leave is inappropriate where there is "undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of amendment, etc." 371 U.S. at 182, 83
S.Ct. at 230. In Zenith v. Hazeltine Research, suprat the court stressed that in
deciding a Rule 15(a) motion "the trial
court was required to take into account any
prejudice that Zenith would have suffered
as a result." 401 U.S. at 331, 91 S.Ct. at
802.
The proffered "third amended complaint"
is in fact the fifth complaint presented by
these plaintiffs to the court.1 This pleading
is 93 pages long and consists of 293 paragraphs. The complaint contains sixty-one
counts asserted against twenty-five different defendants. These defendants include
individuals previously dismissed from the
case as well as new parties; in all twenty
defendants would be added to those presently in the case.*
motion for leave to file this complaint was filed
on May 3, 1977.
6. The plaintiffs would reinstate their claims
against various prosecutors, add additional police defendants, as well as the Sheriff of Lake
County, and institute claims against a local
newspaper, and its managing editor-reporterphotographer.
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This proffered complaint is submitted
nearly two and a half years following the
inception of the case. In determining the
appropriateness of granting leave, the court
cannot be oblivious of the record of plaintiffs' conduct in this litigation prior to this
point. When the repeated pleadings, the
repeated scorn for court orders, the repeated requests for extensions of discovery
are considered, a finding of prejudice to the
current defendants is ineluctable.7 The difficulties in bringing this action into a posture fit for trial have already necessitated
the dismissal of several complaints, and a
transfer of this case to the magistrate. The
introduction of new parties and new factual
controversies at this point will only exacerbate the prior problems. The concomitant
request for an extension of discovery is a
red flag as to the undue delay that the
filing of this complaint would generate.8
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the
instant (second amended) complaint be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons stated
above. Furthermore, the request of the
plaintiffs to file a fifth complaint in this
action is hereby ordered denied.
s/s Bernard M. Decker
United States District Judge
Dated May 13, 1977.

O I KEY NUMBER $Y$TEH>

7. These defendants are entitled to a prompt
resolution of the long standing claims against
them. Of course, the additional prejudice to
the proposed defendants who have been previously dismissed from this action is self-evident.

Michael SUSMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LINCOLN AMERICAN CORP. et aL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Ann FLAMM and Arnold FLAMM,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Rudolph EBERSTADT, Jr. and MICRODOT, INC., Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 78-1293, 78-1310.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 14, 1978.
Decided Oct. 23, 1978.
As Amended Nov. 20, 1978.
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc
Denied Dec. 5, 1978.
The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Joel M.
Flaum, J., dismissed two class action complaints as moot after the defendants tendered to the named plaintiffs their full
monetary damages. Appeals were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals, Fairchild,
Chief Judge, held that: (1) where a motion
for class certification had been pursued
with reasonable diligence and was pending
before the district court, the case did not
become moot merely because of the tender
to the named plaintiffs of their individual
money damages; (2) the district court
should have heard and decided the motion
for class certification before deciding
whether or not the case was mooted by the
tender of money damages; (3) under Delaware law, a derivative suit for money damages brought on behalf of one corporation
and against another could not survive the
merger of the corporations, and (4) a derivative suit against third parties commenced
prior to the merger of corporation on behalf
8. This court recognized that the undue delaying
effect of tardy amended pleading requires a
denial of leave to amend in Forum v. Fidelity &
Deposit, No. 74 C 3747.
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doors to all complaining stockholders without requiring them to show that it was
impossible to obtain redress through regular corporate action, litigation of this kind
would be endless." 187 Md. at 192, 49
A.2d at 453. If substantive opposition
retroactively excuses demand, why would
any investor demand action? If the firm
opposed the suit, then the opposition would
show the futility of demand; if however
the firm embraced and prosecuted the
plaintiffs claim, then the plaintiff would
receive all the relief the court could have
awarded. Demand would be defunct. Yet
Maryland says that demand is the norm.
It must follow that the directors' substantive opposition does not obviate demand.
For the reasons given in our initial opinion, 908 F.2d at 1347-50, the district court's
judgment is reversed to the extent it held
that Kamen is not entitled to pursue a
direct action under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act. The Supreme Court
denied the Fund's petition for certiorari to
review that aspect of our decision, — U.S.
, 111 S.Ct 558, 112 LEd.2d 565 (1990),
as it denied Kamen's petition to the extent
it sought review of our holding, 908 F.2d at
1350-51, that she is not entitled to a jury
trial of her claim under § 36(b), — U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 554,112 L.Ed.2d 561 (1990).
The case is remanded for further proceedings under § 36(b). The judgment is affirmed to the extent it holds that Kamen's
failure to make a demand on the Fund's
directors blocks a derivative action under
§ 20(a).

Marie PERKINS and George Gaynor,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
•.

Marshall SILVERSTEIN, individually
and in his capacity as an administrator
for the Cook County Forest Preserve
District, George Dunne, individually
and in his capacity as a President and
Commissioner for the Cook County

Forest Preserve District, Steve Castans,
individually and in his capacity as
Chief of the Cook County Forest Preserve District Police Department, Chris
Siragusa, individually and in his capacity as a Lieutenant for the Cook County Forest Preserve District, John Gabhart, individually and in his capacity as
an administrator for the Cook County
Forest Preserve District, James Gaughan, individually and in his capacity
as an administrator for the Cook County Forest Preserve District, Lewis Kortas, individually and in his capacity as
a Sergeant for the Cook County Forest
Preserve District, Edward Connelly, individually and in his capacity as a
Lieutenant for the Cook County Forest
Preserve District, Bruce Quintos, individually and in his capacity as a Lieutenant for the Cook County Forest Preserve District, G. Palacios, individually
and in his capacity as a Lieutenant for
the Cook County Forest Preserve District, Sgt. Lawrence, individually and in
his capacity as a Sergeant for the Cook
County Forest Preserve District, Greg
Kinczewski, individually and in his capacity as an attorney for the Cook
County Forest Preserve District and
Cook County Civil Service Commission,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90-1481.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Dec. 5, 1990.
Decided Aug. 7, 1991.
Former probationary police officers
brought employment discrimination suit
following their discharge. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Suzanne
B. Conlon, J., dismissed complaint, and officers appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Grant, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation, held that allegations in original
and amended complaint failed to state any
claims upon which relief could be granted.
Affirmed.
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1. Federal Civil Procedure *=»674
Even under liberal notice pleading,
complaint must identify grounds upon
which claims are based. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Courts *=>713
General reference to "pleadings and
affidavits" contained in plaintiffs' appendix, in place of statement of facts, improperly shifted plaintiffs' burden of pleading
to the court F.R.A.P.Rule 28(a)(3), 28 U.S.
C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=>629
Newspaper articles, commentaries and
editorial cartoons attached to complaint referring to sex-for-jobs scandal were not the
type of documentary evidence or "written
instruments]" which Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure intended to be incorporated into,
and made part of, the complaint. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 10(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Civil Rights <*=>375
Probationary officer's complaint arising out of her discharge failed to state
claim for sexual harassment; complaint alleged "unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors and other
unwelcome verbal and physical conduct of
a sexual nature," but failed to identify any
specific incidents of harassment, when
these "unwelcome advances" occurred, or
identify what the "terms, conditions and
privileges" of her employment were or how
they were affected. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.
5. Civil Rights «=>235(5)
Probationary police officers' complaint
charging due process and equal protection
violations, but failing to identify any property or liberty interest or any prior or
subsequent history of disparate treatment
failed to state claim under § 1983. 42 U.S.
C.A. § 1983.
6. Conspiracy *=>18
Probationary officers failed to state
§ 1985 and 1986 claims arising out of their
discharge, where officers failed to identify
any protected property or liberty interest in
employment or show meeting of minds be-

tween alleged conspirators.
§§ 1985, 1986.

42 U.S.C.A.

7. Civil Rights *=>235(5)
Probationary officers stated no due
process claim under Illinois law arising out
of their discharge, absent citation to statutes, rule or regulation which would entitle
them to hearing before county civil service
commission in connection with discharge or
to continued employment.
8. Civil Rights e=>375
Probationary officer's failure to allege
compliance with administrative filing requirements of ADEA warranted dismissal
of claim. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 626(d).
9. Civil Rights «=»235(3j
Probationary officers alleged no facts
showing that individual defendants acted
pursuant to municipal policy or custom in
discharging them or that such actions
caused them to be deprived of constitutional right, as required to support claim
against such defendants in their official
capacities.
10. Civil Rights e=>362
Administrative filing requirements imposed under Title VII and ADEA are not
jurisdictional prerequisites which pose absolute bar to suit, but rather conditions
precedent, similar to statutes of limitation,
which are subject to equitable modification.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq.,
706(d), (e)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e et seq., 2000e-5(e), (f)(1); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d).
11. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>456
Civil Rights ©=362
Completion of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) intake questionnaire did not constitute charge for purposes of ADEA administrative filing requirement, where plaintiff was informed by
EEOC at time he completed intake questionnaire that there was insufficient information to support his claim of retaliation
and that no further action would be taken
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on the basis of the questionnaire. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d).

and was obviously deficient. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

12. Federal Civil Procedure *»849
Generally, complaint may not be
amended by briefs in opposition to motion
to dismiss.

Peter J. O'Malley (argued), Chicago, 111.,
for plaintiffs-appellants.
Alison E. O'Hara (argued), Office of
Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Lawrence J.
13. Administrative Law and Procedure Suffredin, R. Matthew Simon, Simon & Spitalli, Chicago, III, for defendant-appellee
*=*73
Marshall Silverstein.
Civil Rights *=>364
Lawrence J. Suffredin, R. Matthew SiOfficial not named in Equal Employmon,
Simon & Spitalli, Chicago, 111., for
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
defendants-appellees
George W. Dunne,
charge could not be sued under Title VII.
Steve
Castans,
Chris
Siragusa, John GabCivil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(d), (e)(1), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e), (fXl). hart, James Gaughan, Lewis Kortas, Edward Connelly, Bruce Quintos, G. Palacios,
14. Civil Rights «=>367
Sgt. Lawrence and Greg Kinczewski.
Receipt of right-to-sue letter after comIris E. Sholder, Office of State's Atty. of
plaint had been filed, but before it had been
Cook County, Chicago, 111., for defendantdismissed, effectively cured deficiency in
appellee Cook County Civ. Service Com'n.
original complaint.
15. Federal Civil Procedure *=>825
Plaintiffs right to amend as a matter
of course survives motion to dismiss.

Before COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit
Judges, and GRANT, Senior District
Judge.*

16. Federal Civil Procedure e»825
Probationary officer effectively used
up her right to amend as a matter of
course following dismissal when she attempted to amend complaint to include
right-to-sue letter, and any further amendment required leave of court, but even if
she had retained right to amend as a matter of course, that right was not absolute.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

GRANT, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiffs Marie Perkins and George Gaynor, former probationary police officers for
the Cook County Forest Preserve District
Police Department, filed a sixteen count
employment discrimination suit against
several members of the Department, defendants Castans, Siragusa, Kortas, Connelly,
Quintos, Palacios and Lawrence, two members of the District's administration, defendants Gabhart and Gaughan, the President
of the Forest Preserve District, George
Dunne, the District's Chief Executive Officer, Marshall Silverstein, its attorney, Greg
Kinczewski, and the Cook County Civil Service Commission alleging violations of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.t the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.t the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985,1986, and unidentified state law. The
district court dismissed the complaint in its
entirety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6),

17. Federal Civil Procedure *=>851
Following dismissal of complaint, district court may deny leave to amend if
proposed amendment fails to cure deficiencies in original pleading, or could not survive second motion to dismiss. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
18. Federal Civil Procedure *=>851
Following dismissal of probationary officer's original complaint, district court
properly denied leave to file amended complaint which added nothing of substance
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, is

sitting by designation.
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and denied Perkins* belated motion to ers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596
amend. This appeal followed. For the fol- F.Supp. IS, 21 (N.D.Ill.1984), ajfd, 771
lowing reasons, we now affirm the judg- F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1985). Absent a viable
ment of the district court.
claim under § 1985, the court concluded
there could be no claim under § 1986.
Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, 629 F.2d
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
448,
452 (7th Cir.1980). Plaintiffs' pendent
The Commission was named as a defenstate
due process claims were found to be
dant in only two counts of the complaint,
equally
lacking in that they failed to idenboth alleging violations of procedural due
tify
any
basis for plaintiffs' assertion of a
process under state law. Plaintiffs alleged
right to continued employment with the
that they had a right under the CommisDepartment or to cite any statute, rule or
sion's Rules and Regulations to have the
regulation which would have entitled them
decisions to terminate their employment reto any process beyond that already reviewed by the 'Commission, and that that
ceived.
right was violated. The Commission filed a
We concur with the district court with
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(bX6) contending that there was no provi- respect to all but the Title VII and ADEA
sion for the type of administrative appeal claims, and find any error in the disposition
which plaintiffs sought. The district court of those claims to be harmless.
agreed, citing Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 34, § 1114
and Civil Service Commission Rule IX, Sec.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
12 which give the appointing officer or the
In determining the propriety of dismissal
executive officer in the department in under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the district
which an officer is employed the authority court is bound by the same standard which
to discharge a probationary employee, with binds this court on appeal. It must accept
the consent of the Commission, "upon as- as true all well-pled factual allegations in
signing in writing to [the] Commission his the complaint and draw all r-^isonable inreasons therefor/' and granted the Com- ferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff.
mission's motion to dismiss.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94
Taking their cue from the Commission, S.Ct. 1683,1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Corthe individual defendants moved to dismiss coran v. Chicago Park District, 875 F.2d
the remaining counts of the complaint. On 609, 611 (7th Cir.1989); Gomez v. Illinois
July 24, 1989, the district court granted State Board of Education, 811 F.2d 1030,
that motion and issued a detailed memoran- 1032-33 (7th Cir.1987). If it appears bedum opinion citing various defects in the yond doubt that plaintiffs can prove any
complaint. It dismissed plaintiffs' Title set of facts consistent with the allegations
VII and ADEA claims for lack of jurisdic- in the complaint which would entitle them
tion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(bXl), finding to relief, dismissal is inappropriate. Hithat plaintiffs had failed to allege compli- shon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73,
ance with the "jurisdictional prerequisites" 104 S.Ct 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984);
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e*-5(e) and (fXD and 29 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78
US.C. § 626(d). The §§ 1983 and 1985 S.Ct 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Illiclaims were found to be insufficient be- nois Health Care Ass'n v. Illinois Dept. of
cause plaintiffs failed to identify a protect- Public Health, 879 F.2d 286, 288 (7th Cir.
ed property or liberty interest in their em- 1989). They may not avoid dismissal, howployment, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 ever, simply by attaching bare legal concluU.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct 2701, 2709, 33 sions to narrated facts which fail to outline
L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 the bases of their claims. Sutliff, Inc. v.
U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct 2074, 2079, 48 Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 654
L.Ed.2d 684 (1976), or to allege facte, which (7th Cir.1984); see also, Gomez, 811 F.2d at
if true, would establish the existence of a 1033 (court not bound by plaintiffs' legal
conspiracy among the defendants. Rodg- characterization of the facts); Strauss v.
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City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767-68 (7th
Cir.1985) (absence of any facts to support
plaintiffs claim renders allegations mere
legal conclusions subject to dismissal).
If the district court found it difficult to
apply this standard in the present case, we
sympathize. It was an onerous task. The
complaint lacks material factual allegations, contains a tedious repetition of legal
conclusions, and improperly joins the plaintiffs' claims in a single action.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Allegations
[1,2] To suggest that the factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaint were not
"well-pled" is an understatement. While
plaintiffs make clear in their original complaint what their claims are, they fail to
identify the grounds upon which their
claims are based.1 This they must do, even
under the liberal notice pleading of Rule
8(a). Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct at
102. In place of particularized factual allegations, plaintiffs assault us with general
statements of the law which were lifted
verbatim from federal statutes, regulations
and case law dealing with employment discrimination, i.e., "quid pro quo harassment," "hostile work environment," "unwelcome sexual advances," "age discrimination," "wrongful termination," "equal
protection," "due process," and "conspiracy." See Sutliff, Inc., 727 F.2d at 654
(complaint which merely recites statutory
language and related legalese but fails to
allege minimal material factual allegations
outlining violation of the law insufficient).
Apparently reading Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) as
a license to plead their case by exhibit,
plaintiffs attached an assortment of letters,

newspaper articles, commentaries, cartoons
and miscellaneous other exhibits to their
Complaint, leaving it to the court to extract
the relevant facts. To the extent plaintiffs
rely on this haphazard compilation to fill
the void left in their complaint, their reliance is misplaced. The exhibits show that
there were non-discriminatory reasons for
terminating plaintiffs' employment; that
plaintiffs were accorded a full-adversary
pre-termination hearing; and that they
were discharged on the basis of a hearing
board's recommendation and, in Perkins'
case, the decision of the President of the
District, defendant George Dunne. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to see how these
facts, and those which follow, favor the
plaintiffs' case.
1. Perkins
According to the exhibits, Perkins attempted suicide on March 24, 1988, and
was consequently charged with a violation
of Department Rule 15.20 which prohibits
officers from engaging in any activities, on
or off duty, "which indicate instability of
character or personality," and "give the
appearance of impropriety." The hearing
originally scheduled for April 6, 1988 was
continued at Perkins' request, or on her
behalf, until June 23, 1988.
[3] In late April, 1988, the Chicago media featured defendant Dunne as the subject of a sex-for-jobs scandal.2 Perkins'
role in the scandal is unclear. While she
apparently made a public disclosure of the
fact that she and Dunne had, at some unidentified point in time, engaged in a sexual
relationship, she later denied any connection between their relationship and her job
with the Department.

1. The absence of any factual background is also
were provided prove far more beneficial to the
evident in plaintiffs' appellate brief. In place of
defendants than the plaintiffs.
the statement of facts mandated by Fed.R.
App.P, 28(a)(3), we find a general reference to 2. The newspaper articles, commentaries and edthe "pleadings and affidavits" contained in
itorial cartoons which Perkins attached to the
plaintiffs' appendix. We strongly disapprove of
complaint referencing this "scandal," are not the
this tactic. See Skagen v. Sears, Roebuck £ Co., type of documentary evidence or "written in910 F.2d 1498, 1500 n. 2 (7th Cir.1990). It
strument[s]M which Fed.RXiv.P. 10(c) intended
improperly shirts the plaintiffs' burden of pleadto be incorporated into, and made a part of, the
ing to the courts, and imposes upon us the
complaint. See generally, Wright & Miller, Fedtime-consuming job of reconstructing the facts.
eral Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327, p.
In the present case, the facts with which we
763 and n. 7 (2d ed. 1990).
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A Hearing Board comprised of defendants Siragusa, Gabhart and Gaughan convened on June 23,1988 to hear the charges
stemming from the attempted suicide. At
the conclusion of the evidence, the Board
unanimously agreed that Perkins* conduct
indicated instability of character, gave the
appearance of impropriety, and "threatened] in the future the safety of herself,
her fellow officers, and the public." The
Board recommended termination^ and
Dunne, as President of the District, made
the final discharge decision.
[4] On the basis of these "facts," Perkins concludes that she was the victim of
"quid pro quo sexual harassment" and a
"hostile work environment." She alleges
that Silverstein and Dunne subjected her to
"unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome
requests for sexual favors and other unwelcome verbal and physical conduct of a
sexual nature," and that the defendants'
conduct "substantially affected the terms,
conditions, and privileges of [her] employment," but fails to identify any specific
incidents of harassment, to tell us when
these "unwelcome advances" occurred, or
to identify what the "terms, conditions and
privileges" of her employment were, or
how they were affected.
[5-7] In her § 1983 claims, Perkins
charges Silverstein and Dunne with violating the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, but
fails to identify any property or liberty
interest in her employment or to allege any
prior or subsequent history of disparate
treatment Her §§ 1985 and 1986 claims
are premised on an alleged conspiracy to
deprive her of rights and privileges accorded her under the fourteenth amendment
and Title VII, but again fail to identify any
protected property or liberty interest in her
employment or to show a meeting of the
minds between the alleged coconspirators.
We also note that to the extent these
claims are premised on a violation of rights
created by Title VII, they are in direct
conflict with Great American Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442
U.S. 366, 378, 99 S.Ct 2345, 2352, 60
L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). The pendent state due

process allegations are also insufficient.
Perkins cites no statute, rule or regulation
which would entitle her to a hearing before
the Commission in connection with her discharge, or to continued employment with
the Department.
2. Gaynor
In Gaynor's case, the exhibits show that
he was the subject of at least five written
reports between July 21, 1988 and August
20, 1988 in which his conduct or performance as a police officer was questioned by
his superior officers, defendants Palacios,
Lawrence and Quintos. The incident which
ultimately led to Gaynor's termination occurred on August 28, 1988. While on duty
with another officer, Gaynor engaged in a
conversation in which he made several derogatory remarks about the Department
and his superiors and stated that he would
be willing to falsify information on a police
report. Unknown to Gaynor, the radio in
the squad car was "keyed up" and the
conversation was broadcast over the airwaves, recorded at the station and was
overheard by a supervisor, defendant Quintos. Gaynor was subsequently charged
with violating Department Rule 14.9 which
provides:
Any officer of the Department who shall
in the performance of his/her official
duties display reluctance to properly perform his/her assigned duties, or who
act[s] in a manner tending to bring discredit upon themself or the Department,
or who fails to assume responsibility or
exercise diligence, intelligence, and interest in the pursuit of their duties, or
whose actions or performance in a position, rank or assignment are below acceptable standards, may be deemed incompetent and shall be subject to dismissal from the Department
(Emphasis added).
On September 16,1988, a Formal Inquiry
Board comprised of defendants Castans,
Gabhart, and Connelly convened to hear
the charges against Gaynor, and his defense thereto The Board concluded on the
basis of the evidence presented that Gaynor was guilty of violating Department
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Rules 14.9, 18.12 and 18.14,* and requested
that he be terminated.
Gaynor alleges in his complaint that he
was 56 years old "at the time of his employment"; that he was performing his
duties as a police officer in a reasonably
proficient manner;4 and, that defendants
Silverstein, Castans, Gabhart, Gaughan,
Quintos, Palacios, and Lawrence initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him as "a
pretext to the discriminatory motive of age
discrimination." He alleges that his
"wrongful termination" and replacement
by a "non-civil service temporary appointee
office" constituted a violation of the
ADEA. Gaynor's due process allegations
are virtually identical to Perkins'. He challenges his termination under § 1983 and
unidentified state law, contending that he
was deprived of a protected liberty and
property interest in "completing his probationary period as a police officer and thereby obtaining full Civil Service status"; that
he was "stigmatized and prevented] from
obtaining future employment"; and, that
he was denied the opportunity to have the
real reasons for his termination heard by
the Commission. His claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are premised on
an alleged conspiracy among the defendants to knowingly deprive him of "rights
and privileges" protected under the ADEA
and the fourteenth amendment, and their
failure to prevent that deprivation.
[8] Gaynor's §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and
pendent state claims are, in almost all respects, identical to those we found insufficient in Perkins' case. Gaynor fails to
identify a protected property or liberty interest in his employment, to show a meeting of the minds between the alleged coconspirators, or to cite any statute, rule or
regulation which would entitle him to a
hearing before the Commission in connection with his discharge, or to continued
employment with the Department The
3. Department Rule 18.12 is neglect of duty.
Rule 18.14 is inattention to duty.
4. Gaynor alleges that "he met the reasonable
proficiency standards for the performance of
N
his duties as a police officer
The exhibits,
which he attached to the complaint, show otherwise. In determining the sufficiency of the

substantive deficiencies in his ADEA allegations are too numerous to count. We
need cite but one, Gaynor's failure to allege
compliance with the administrative filing
requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), to find
that dismissal of the ADEA claim and any
claim premised thereon was warranted.
S. "Official Capacity"
[9] To the extent plaintiffs seek damages against the defendants in their official
capacities, their complaint is in effect an
action against Cook County, a municipality.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-66,105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d
114 (1985); Leahy v. Board of Trustees of
Community College District No. 508, 912
P.2d 917, 922 (7th Cir.1990). To support
such a claim, the plaintiffs must allege
facts, which if true, would show that the
defendants acted pursuant to a municipal
policy or custom when they discharged the
plaintiffs, and that such actions caused
them to be deprived of a right protected by
the Constitution. Graham, 473 U.S. at
166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105; Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, All U.S. 808, 817-18, 105 S.Ct.
2427, 2432-33, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
They have done neither.
B. The Title VII and ADEA Claims
110] In dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII
and ADEA claims, the district court erroneously concluded that 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e), (fXD and 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
were "jurisdictional prerequisites." They
are not Since Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 V.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct
1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) and
Stearns v. Consolidated Management,
Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir.1984), we
have consistently held that the administracomplaint we must rely on the exhibits whenever the allegations of the complaint are materially inconsistent with those exhibits. See Foshee
v. Daoust Construction Co., 185 F.2d 23, 25 (7th
Cir. 1950); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327, pp. 766-67.
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tive filing requirements imposed under Title VII and the ADEA are not ''jurisdictional prerequisites" which pose an absolute
bar to suit, but rather "conditions precedent/' similar to statutes of limitations,
which are subject to equitable modification.
Stark v. Dynascan Corp., 902 F.2d 549,
551 (7th Cir.1990) (ADEA); Schnellbaecher
v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126
(7th Cir.1989) (Title VII); Smith v. General
Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1317 (7th
Cir.1989) (ADEA); Anooya v. Hilton Hotel
Corp., 733 F.2d 48, 49 (7th Cir.1984) (Title
VII).

retaliation and that no further action would
be taken on the basis of the questionnaire.
(12] The distinction, however, is far
more significant in Perkins* case. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) provide in
relevant part as follows:
(e) A charge under this section shall be
filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred and notice of the
charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon
the person against whom such charge is
made
within ten days thereafter
[11] In Gaynor's case, the distinction is
(f)(1)....
If a charge filed with the
immaterial. He neither alleges compliance
Commission ... is dismissed by the Comwith § 626(d),5 nor demonstrates an eqmission, or if within one hundred and
uitable basis for modifying the requireeighty days from the filing of such
ments set out therein. In an affidavit in
charge or the expiration of any period of
response to the motion to dismiss, Gaynor
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of
attempts to argue that his completion of an
this section, whichever is later, the ComEEOC intake questionnaire satisfies the remission has not filed a civil action under
quirements of § 626(d). The district court
this section ... [or] has not entered into
disagreed, as do we. In Steffen v. Meridia conciliation agreement to which the
an Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 544 (7th
person aggrieved is a party, the CommisCir.1988), cert denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109
sion .. shall so notify the person agS.Ct. 3191, 105 L.Ed.2d 699 (1989), we held
grieved and within ninety days after the
that an intake questionnaire may, under
giving of such notice a civil action may
certain circumstances, constitute a charge
be brought against the respondent
for purposes of the ADEA administrative
filing requirements, i.e., where the informanamed in the charge [] by the person
tion contained in the questionnaire was sufclaiming to be aggrieved
ficient to constitute a charge, and both the Perkins failed to allege compliance with
claimant and EEOC indicated that they either of these filing requirements in her
would treat the questionnaire as a charge. original complaint. The omission was not
See also Phxlbin v. General Electric Capi- inadvertent. Perkins did not have a righttal Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324-25 to-sue letter when she filed her complaint,
(7th Cir.1991). Those circumstances are and had not named Dunne in the adminisnot present in this case. Gaynor acknowl- trative charge which she filed with the
edges in his affidavit that he was informed EEOC. She attempted to cure both overby the EEOC at the time he completed the sights in her response to the defendants'
intake questionnaire that there was insuffi- motion to dismiss.* She had, by that time,
cient information to support his claim of procured a right-to-sue letter from the
5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) provides:
No civil action may be commenced by an
individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days
after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been hied with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a
charge shall be hied
6. As a general rule, a complaint may not be
amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss Thomason v. Nachtneb, 888 F.2d 1202,

1205 (7th Cir.1989); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1984),
cert, denied, 470 VS 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 84
LEd.2d 821 (1985). In the present case, however, the district court appears to have deemed
the exhibits attached to the plaintiffs' opposition
bnef to be a part of the complaint, and considered those exhibits in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint.
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EEOC which she attached to her response (per curiam), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 912, 93
brief. With respect to defendant Dunne, S.Ct. 976, 35 LEd.2d 275 (1973). Had the
she argued that Silverstein had been Title VII allegations been sufficient in all
named in the EEOC charge and that notice other respects, reversal would have been
to Silverstein constituted notice to Dunne warranted and Perkins would have been
since they were both administrators of the afforded the opportunity to amend her
complaint to show compliance with the statForest Preserve District
[13] To the extent Perkins alleges any ute. They were not. As our previous discussion clearly indicates, Perkins* Title VII
violation of Title VII by Dunne, the district
claims were subject to dismissal for reacourt correctly concluded that her claims
sons totally unrelated to jurisdiction.
are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000«-5(f)(l).
Perkins does not dispute the fact that
C. The Motion to Amend
George Dunne was not named in the
Although the district court clearly anticicharge which she filed with the EEOC.
pated that the plaintiffs might attempt to
Her public denial of any connection beamend their pleadings following dismissal,
tween her relationship with Dunne and her four months elapsed before Perkins filed
job with the Department suggests a rea- her motion for leave to amend and supplesonable explanation for that omission. ment her portion of the complaint The
Neither has she alleged any facts which motion provided no explanation or excuse
warrant an exception to the general rule for the delay. The allegations of the prothat a party not named in the EEOC charge posed amended complaint mirror those of
cannot be sued under Title VII. See the first in several respects, expand the
Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126-27; Eggle-federal and state due process allegations to
ston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers1 include specific citations to Illinois law and
Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890, the Commission's Rules, and add a claim
905 (7th Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. under the first amendment.
1017,102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982);
Citing the untimeliness of the amendLeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 484
ment
and its failure to cure deficiencies
F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir.1973).
previously identified, the district court de[14] The disposition of Perkins1 Title nied leave to amend. On appeal, Perkins
VII claims against Silverstein is not quite contends that she had an absolute right to
so simple. While they may have been sub- amend her complaint as a matter of course
ject to dismissal at any time prior to Per- under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and that the diskins' receipt of a right-to-sue letter, the trict court erred in summarily denying her
receipt of that letter after the complaint that right. We disagree.
had been filed, but before it had been dis[15-17] While a plaintiffs right to
missed, effectively cured the deficiency in amend as a matter of course survives a
the original complaint Williams v. Wash- motion to dismiss, Car Carriers, Inc. v.
ington Metro. Area Transit Authority, Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1111 (7th
721 F.2d 1412, 1418 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1983); Cir.1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105
Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Au- S.Ct. 1758, 84 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), Perkins
thority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. effectively used up that right when she
1983); Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer made her first attempt to amend the comCorp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir.1982); plaint to include the right-to-sue letter.
Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Divi- Any further amendment required leave of
sion of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211,1218 court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the grant or
(5th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert denied, denial of which was subject to the court's
459 U.S. 1105,103 S.Ct 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel(1983); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School tine Research, 401 US. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct.
Board, 649 F.2d 1084, 1095 n. 13 (5th Cir. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Amendola
1981); Henderson v. Eastern Freight v. Bayer, 907 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir.1990).
Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir.1972) Even if Perkins had retained a right to
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amend as a matter of course, that right
was not absolute. Williams v. US. Postal
Service, 873 F.2d 1069, 1072 (7th Cir.1989);
Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern
Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1391
and n. 1 (7th Cir.1983), Sarfaty v. Nowak,
369 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir.1966), cert denied, 387 U.S. 909, 87 S.Ct 1691, 18
L.Ed.2d 627 (1967). Under either circumstance, a district court may deny leave to
amend if the proposed amendment fails to
cure the deficiencies in the original pleading, or could not survive a second motion to
dismiss. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962);
Glick v. Koenig, 766 FJ2d 265, 268-69 (7th
Cir.1985); Wakeen v. Hoffman House,
Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir.1983);
Textor, 711 F.2d at 1391 and n. 1; Jafree v.
Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir.1982);
Asher v. Harrington, 461 F.2d 890, 895
(7th Cir.1972). To hold otherwise would
impose upon the defendants and the courts
the arduous task of responding to an obviously futile gesture on the part of the
plaintiffs. Rule 15(a) does not require the
courts to undertake such an exercise.
Glick, 766 F.2d at 268-69.
[18] While the amended complaint is
significantly longer than the first, it adds
nothing of any substance. Perkins repeats
her Title VII allegations against Dunne,
ignoring the fact that she failed to name
him in the EEOC charge. See Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126-27 (as a general
rule a party not named in the EEOC charge
cannot be sued under Title VII). Her Title
VII allegations against Silverstein remain
vague and conclusory. Her attempts to
bolster her due process arguments with
actual citations to Illinois law and the Commission's Rules ignore the express language of Ill.Rev.Stat ch. 34, § 1118 which
gives the appointing officers or executive
head of the Department the right to discharge a probationary employee without
reference to the procedures provided for
the removal, discharge or suspension of
non-probationary classified service employees.7 Under Illinois law and the Commis7. Section 1118 provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee serving his or her
probationary penod
may be discharged by
the appointing officers or the executive head

sion's Rules, the appointing officer may
discharge a probationary employee, with
the consent of the Commission, upon assigning in writing to the Commission the
reasons therefor. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 34,
§ 1114 and Commission Rule IX, Sec. 12.
Perkins' contention on appeal that the Commission was required to consent to the reasons for the discharge is directly contradicted by Alberty v. Daniel, 25 Ill.App.3d
291, 323 N.E.2d 110 (1974) (Commission
required to consent only to the discharge,
not as to the reason). Perkins expands her
§ 1983 claim to add allegations of a first
amendment violation, but fails to supply us
with anything more than conclusory legal
allegations, or to explain why the court
should allow her to assert an additional
claim almost a year after the original complaint was filed. The allegations of a conspiracy in her §§ 1985 and 1986 claims are
totally unsupported by any facts. See
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,
596 F.Supp. 13, 21 (N.D.I11.1984), affd, 111
F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1985). As the district
court correctly noted, there can be no cause
of action under § 1986 absent a viable
§ 1985 claim. Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, 629 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1980).
Granting leave to file an amended complaint which is so obviously deficient would
indeed have been an exercise in futility,
and could have potentially subjected plaintiffs and their counsel to Rule 11 sanctions.
We will not require a district court to indulge in such futile gestures. Glick, 766
F.2d at 268-69.
IV. CONCLUSION
The allegations of the original and
amended complaint fail to state any claims
upon which relief could be granted. The
judgment of the district court dismissing
plaintiffs' cause of action is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED

of the department, institution or office in
which such officer or employee is then employed, without reference to the provisions of
this section.
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be said to have discharged men for engaging in a protected concerted activity
when they had no knowledge that such
an activity was occurring.8

Board's order because we "cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when
viewed in the light that the record in its
entirety furnishes, including the body of
evidence opposed to the Board's view."
Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,
340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95
L.Ed. 456.
The Board's petition for enforcement
of its order is ordered denied.

[1] In many respects this case parallels that of N. L. R. B. v. Draper Corporation, 4 Cir., 145 F.2d 199 at page
205, 156 A.L.R. 989, where the court
stated: "It should be noted that a 'wild
cat* strike in violation of the purposes
of the act and of an agreement existing
between the employer and employees for
orderly collective bargaining is clearly
distinguishable from a strike which, alS>
though not justified, nevertheless accords
with the rights of the parties under the
National Labor Relations Act. # # #
[Minorities who engage in 'wild cat'
strikes, in violation of rights established
by the collective bargaining statute, can
SHALL v. HENRY etaL
find nothing in that statute which proNo. 10966.
tects them from discharge."
United States Court of Appeals
Even if the walkout in this case had
Seventh Circuit
been a strike, it was a strike in violation
March 5, 1954.
4
of the grievance and safety procedures
laid down in the contract between the
Action for accounting of plaintiff's
Union and the respondent and hence was
share
of the profits realized from boxing
not a protected activity. See N. L. R. B.
matches
in which defendant boxer, manv. American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 5 Cir.,
aged
by
plaintiff and two other individ203 F.2d 212, 216-217, and cases cited.
ual defendants, engaged, segregation of
[2,3] We recognize the power of the any moneys received by defendant boxBoard to draw "reasonable inferences" ing club corporation for defendant boxfrom the evidential facts found at the er's and his managers' benefit, and treble
hearing, see Radio Officers' Union v. damages for alleged conspiracy of such
N. L. R. B., 347 U.S. 17, 74 S.Ct. 323, defendants and other defendant boxing
but we hold that the inferences drawn by club corporations in violation of the
the Board in this case were not reason- Anti-Trust Acts. From a judgment of
able. We deny enforcement to the the District Court for the Northern Dis3. It is true that there is some evidence
that management personnel of the respondent had some knowledge that a
walkout might occur on June 4, but all
of their testimony in this regard reveals
that they contemplated a district-wide.
walkout such as is frequently resorted to
by the Union as a method of showing its
power, and not a local walkout by some
of the men in its mine to protest the failure to correct the grievance.
4. The contract provides for a detailed
grievance procedure, starting with a complaint by the employee or a member of
the Union's grievance committee and the
employee's immediate superior, through

Company channels up to the highest
Company officer at the mine, and finally
submission to an arbitration board consisting of a member appointed by the
Company, one appointed by the Union,
and one appointed by these two.
In addition, the contract calls for a
Safety Committee composed of three
employee and three company representatives. This committee is required to hold
bi-weekly meetings and to make suggestions to the Company as to safety conditions. In the event that the suggestions of the committee are not carried
out by the Company, the Union may have
recourse to the grievance procedure.
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trict of Illinois, Eastern Division, William J. Campbell, J., dismissing plaintiff's fourth amended and supplemental
complaint for want of jurisdiction, plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Lindley, Circuit Judge, held that plaintiff
being a resident of California and only
one of defendants a resident of Illinois,
the District Court was without jurisdiction to proceed against any of defendants.
Judgment affirmed.
L Monopolies G»12(6)
The Anti-Trust Laws Acts are inapplicable to athletic contests such as boxing matches. Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
§ 1-8, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note; Clayton Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 12
et seq.
2. Courts S»S59
Whether plaintiff in action brought
in Federal District Court for Northern
District of Illinois for accounting of
plaintiff's share of profits from boxing
matches in which defendant boxer, managed by plaintiff and two individual codefendants, engaged, has right to have
such court decree an equitable lien on
and isolate moneys thereafter becoming
due such boxer from defendant boxing
club corporation because of his participation in boxing bouts promoted by it
must be determined by laws of Illinois.
3. Principal and Agent <S=>90(1)
In action against a professional boxer, managed by plaintiff and two other
individual defendants, for accounting of
plaintiff's share of profits from boxing
matches in which such boxer engaged,
federal district court, under Illinois law,
could not decree an equitable lien on,
isolate, and compel defendant boxing club
corporations to hold, funds received by
them for such boxer's benefit because of
his participation in bouts promoted by
them in order that court might later determine how much, if any, of such funds
might be due plaintiff.
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risdiction to proceed against any of defendants in action based on diversity of
citizenship by a California resident
against four corporations, of which only
one was resident of Illinois, and three
individual defendants residing in other
states, for accounting, though nonresident corporations were doing business in
such district. 28 U.S.OA. § 1391.
& Federal Civil Procedure €=>570
The practice as to waiver of right to
be sued in proper federal district was
changed by federal civil procedure rule
so that defenses to merits may now be
set up in same pleading including defenses of court's lack of jurisdiction of
person and wrong venue without waiving
such defenses, and special appearances
to challenge such jurisdiction or venue
are no longer necessary. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc. rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
6. Federal Civil Procedure G=>1822
Defendants' motions to dismiss federal district court action for want of jurisdiction because of lack of diversity
of parties' citizenship after filing of
plaintiff's fourth and final amended and
supplemental complaint were timely,
though defendants might have filed answer setting up question of jurisdiction,
as well as defenses on merits, without
waiving right to object to jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
7. Federal Civil Procedure S=>829
Though right to amend pleadings
.must be construed liberally, district
.court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's application to amend
complaint after permitting three amendments thereof, especially where disposition of case on points relied on by defendants could not have been avoided by
further amendments of complaint.

Louis M. March, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Vincent D. McConnell, Charles H. Watson, Chicago, 111., Peabody, Westbrook,
4. Courts <S=>273
The federal district court for North- Watson & Stephenson, Chicago, 111., of
ern District of Illinois was without ju- counsel, for appellees.
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and elaborating upon his original averments.
The motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction previously filed were allowed
to stand to this amended complaint On
UNDLEY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from an order dis- May 9, plaintiff filed his fourth commissing his suit. His original complaint, plaint, calling it a "third amended and
filed January 30, 1952, averred that he, supplemental complaint", wherein he
a licensed manager of professional ath- named as additional defendants Internaletes, had a contract with defendant tional Boxing Club, Inc., a New York
Clarence Henry, a boxer, whereby he was corporation, International Boxing Club
to participate in Henry's management of Michigan, Inc., a Michigan corporaand receive a percentage of the resulting tion, and International Boxing Club of
profits. He sought an accounting from Missouri, Inc., a Missouri corporation.
He included in this pleading a claim
defendants Henry, Stiefel and Palermo,
the two latter being co-managers with against all defendants for treble damplaintiff, asserting that they were at- ages incurred, as he averred, as the retempting to deprive him of his share of sult of an alleged conspiracy upon their
the profits realized from the boxing part in violation of the Anti-Trust laws
matches in which Henry had been en- of the United States. Defendants again
gaged from time to time and in which interposed motions to dismiss for want
he might engage in the future. At that of jurisdiction, insisting that diversity
time Henry was about to participate in of citizenship did not exist; that the
a contest under the auspices of the In- amount in controversy did not exceed
ternational Boxing Club, Inc., an Illinois $3000; that no valid cause of action was
corporation. The Club was joined as de- stated in the claim for damages under
fendant, not because it was a party to the Anti-Trust Act and that the court
the contract but because it was the re- lacked jurisdiction of the suit because
sponsible party sponsoring the match. it appeared from the complaint that
Plaintiff sought to segregate such mon- plaintiff resided in California and not in
eys as might come into the hands of the Illinois and that not all of the defendants
corporation for the benefit of Henry and resided in the Northern District of Illinois as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
his managers.
On July 14 plaintiff was permitted to
An application for a restraining order
file
his fifth pleading, namely, an amendwas made, at which counsel for the corporation appeared, insisting that the ed and supplemental complaint enlarging
court had no jurisdiction. The court, upon the charges for an accounting and
being fully occupied with a busy calen- upon those under the Anti-Trust Act.*
dar, referred the application to the mas- The motions to dismiss for want of juter for settlement of issues and recom- risdiction previously interposed were
mendations. On February 4, the cor- permitted to stand to this fifth and final
porate defendant filed a formal motion, complaint.
entering a special appearance, questionArguments upon the motions to dising the jurisdiction of the court and, miss were heard by the master on July
shortly later, the three individual defend- 22. On October 24 he filed his report,
ants HeAry, Stiefel and Palermo pre- finding that the question of jurisdiction
sented a similar motion. Oit February of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 had
21, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, been timely raised and that the cause
enlarging substantially upon his original must fail because of that statutory proaverments. Again all defendants en- vision. He recommended further that,
tered special appearances and moved to in view of the fact that there was no
dismiss for want of jurisdiction* On averment that anything was due from
March 29, plaintiff filed a second amend- the corporate defendants, under the law
ed and supplemental complaint, further of Illinois, they were not subject to equiBefore DUFFY, UNDLEY
SWAIM, Circuit Judges.
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table garnishment; that the claim for
accounting must, therefore, fail as to
them, and that no sufficient cause of action under the Anti-Trust Acts was pre
sented against any of the defendants.
The court approved the report of the
master and dismissed the complaint. The
court also refused at that time to permit
plaintiff's motion to file a sixth pleading,
i. e., one amending the last onefiled.Up*
on appeal plaintiff insists that the court
erred in each of the respects mentioned.
[1] All defendants were charged in
the second portion of the final complaint
with having violated the Anti-Trust
Acts. We are of the opinion that the
District Court rightly held that this
claim failed to state a cause of action
under the statute. That the business of
professional baseball is not within the
Anti-Trust Act, was established in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. "Na*
tional League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66
L.Ed. 898.
The Supreme Court, on November
9, 1953 adhered to this doctrine in Tool*
eon v. New York Yankees, Inc., and two
other cases disposed of at the same time,
346 U.S. 356, where the court declared,
at 357, 74 S.Ct. 78, at 79, that Congress
"had no intention of including the busi*
ness of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws." Those decisions
must control unless there is some significant legal distinction between the
business of promoting and producing
boxing bouts at various places in the
United States and that of professional
baseball. A District Court has recently
held that boxing is not to be distinguished from that of a professional base
ball game, in U, S. v. International Box*
ing Club, Inc. (D.C.S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8,
1954, Noonan, J.) The same court, in
U. S. v. Schubert (Dec. 30, 1953, Knox,
J.) held that there is no legal difference
between theatrical production and professional baseball.
We agree that a professional boxing
contest is not to be distinguished legally
from that of a professional baseball
game. Obviously each involves a contest of physical skill and endurance tak-

ing place in a particular locality. The
success of each depends upon the support
of the public in the purchase of tickets
and the sale of radio and television
rights. Each baseball game is unique;
no two are exactly alike. Each boxing
contest is unlike any other. The profitable promotion of each depends upon the
same elements. Under the mandate of
the Supreme Court, therefore, we must
hold that it was not the intention of Congress to extend the provisions of the
Anti-Trust laws to athletic contests such
as those involved in boxing. Consequently the District Court properly dismissed
the complaint in so far as it involved
a suit for treble damages under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note,
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et
seq.
12] The corporate defendants were
included as defendants in the accounting
charge solely because they were said to
be promoting boxing exhibitions and, in
doing so, were collecting money which
would eventually be due in part to the
participants, a percentage of which in
turn would accrue to plaintiff. The theory seems to be that plaintiff had a right
to have the court decree an equitable lien
upon and isolate moneys thereafter becoming due defendant Henry from the
corporation as a result of his participation in bouts. Whether such a contention is correct must be determined by
the laws of Illinois. As the master has
pointed out, this question has been decisively determined in Lewis v. West
Side Trust & Savings Bank, 288 111. A pp.
271, 6 N.E.2d 481. There plaintiff
sought to tie up moneys which he claimed
might become due him, though held by
third persons, by establishing an equitable lien on or garnishment of the funds
in the hands of third persons held for the
benefit of others. The court framed the
question thus 288 IU.App. at page 277,
6 N.E.2d at page 484: "We gather from
the argument of complainants that the
purpose of this order is to retain the
property of its stockholders in the possession of the bank or the receiver so
that should a judgment be entered in this
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suit against a stockholder for his constitutional liability, complainants could
satisfy the judgment out of the property
so retained by the receiver. In other
words, such procedure and remedy as
would be equivalent to an attachment at
law." After discussing the Illinois authorities, the court continued: "There
is no such thing as equitable attachment
in this state and the theory of taking
away the control of a person's property
by means of an injunction for the purpose of anticipating a judgment which
may or may not thereafter be obtained by
a litigant is abhorrent to the principles
of equitable jurisdiction. As Mr. Justice Caton said in his opinion in the
Phelps case, which we have just quoted:
«• « • I am not aware of any principle
of equity jurisprudence which will justify the issuing an injunction in such a
case, to compel the parties to hold the
goods pending a trial at law, to see if
they will not be wanted to answer an execution upon a judgment which the complainant hopes to obtain/ " 288 IllApp.
at pages 278-279, 6 N.E.2d at page 484.
[3] The Illinois statutes provide for
attachment suits, but plaintiff has made
no attempt to comply with those acts.
They provide also for garnishment of
fufct^s, after a judgment has been entered
but temains unsatisfied, in the hands of
third persons, but plaintiff has not
brought himself within those provisions.
Therefore, under the averments of the
complaint, in view of the Illinois decisions, none of the corporate defendants
could be compelled to hold such funds as
might come into their hands for the benefit of Henry in order that the court
might later determine how much thereof, if anything, might be due plaintiff.
Consequently the court properly dismissed the accounting suit as to the corporate defendants.
[4] There remains for disposition,
therefore, only the accounting charge
against the three individual defendants.
However, we find it unnecessary to determine whether a valid claim for an accounting has been presented, for the reason that, in our opinion, the court was

without jurisdiction to proceed. The
suit was based upon diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that a
civil action founded only on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all
defendants reside. The record discloses
that plaintiff was a resident of California
and that of the defendants only one was
a resident of Illinois. Defendants Henry, Stief el and Palermo all resided in other states. Consequently, if the point was
properly and timely raised, the court was
without jurisdiction to proceed against
any of the defendants. Seaboard Rice
Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co., 270 U.S. 363, 46 S.Ct. 247, 70 L.Ed.
633.
We have observed that, from the beginning, each of the defendants has insisted that the court was without jurisdiction. They might have filed answers
and in them preserved the question of
jurisdiction. Rule 12 of Civil Rules of
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. However, no answers were filed but motions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction and for failure
to state a cause of action were interposed to each of the many pleadings submitted by plaintiff. Where neither defendants nor plaintiff reside within the
district, the court has no jurisdiction.
Such is the intent of the statute and it
must control. Blank v. Bitker, 7 Cir.,
135 F.2d 962; Martin v. Lain Oil & Gas
Co., D.C.E.D.M., 36 F.Supp. 252. Consequently the court properly dismissed
the entire suit. Admitting arguendo
that the nonresident corporations were
doing business in the Northern District
of Illinois, the fact still remains that
none of the other defendants was a resident of that district. This fatality of
jurisdiction is decisive.
[5,6] We think the trial court properly found that no waiver of the rights
to be sued in the proper district had occurred. There is not the slightest bit
of evidence in the record to show that
defendants waived their right to object
to the jurisdiction of the court. As we
said in Blank v. Bitker, 7 Cir., 135 F.2d
962, at page 966: "Under the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure, which were in
effect when this action was instituted,
the prior practice as to waiver was
changed so that defenses to the merits
may now be set up in the same pleading
which includes defenses of lack of juris*
diction of the person and wrong venue,
without waiving the latter defenses.
Rule 12(b) so provides, in stating that
'no defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading * • • / And authorities
supporting and applying Rule 12(b) are
growing in number. Accordingly, special appearances to challenge jurisdiction
over the person or improper venue are
no longer necessary." See also Martin
v. Lain Oil & Gas Co., D.C., 36 F.Supp,
252, at pages 254-255. Here, when the
fifth and last pleading was presented,
defendants might have filed an answer,
setting up the question as to jurisdiction
under Section 1391, while answering on
the merits, without a waiver of the right
to object because plaintiff had not
brought himself within Section 1391.
Rule 12(b). Instead of answering, it presented its motion to dismiss. We agree
with the master that this was timely
pleading.
[7] In view of the many amendments
to the complaint permitted by the court
and the voluminous pleadings filed as
a result, even though the right to amend
is to be construed liberally, we think the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying at the time of judgment application to amend still further. There must
be an end sometime to applications to
amend. Plaintiff had five chances to
state his case. Under the circumstances
disclosed by the record, there was no
abuse of discretion in this respect. This
conclusion is fortified by the fact that
the disposition of this case upon the
points upon which we have relied could
not have been avoided by further amendments. The fatal questions of jurisdiction and venue could not have been avoided by any amendment The fact that no
proper action under the Anti-Trust Act
exists could not have been obviated. Con-

sequently, whether the amendment was
allowed or not, this court would have
been impelled to reach the conclusion it
has reached on the deficiencies referred
to in this opinion.
In view of our conclusions we do not
reach the further questions submitted by
the parties. The judgment is
Affirmed.
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In re PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. OP
NEW JERSEY.
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION.
UNITED CORP.
v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION.
Nos. 11120, 11130.
United States Court of Appeals
Third Circuit
Argued Jan. 18, 1954.
Decided Feb. 24,1954.
Proceeding on petitions to review
supplemental order of Securities and
Exchange Commission reducing attorneys' fee for services in connection with
dissolution of public utility corporation
and disallowing compensation for expenses incurred by parent holding company. The Court of Appeals, McLaughlin, Circuit Judge, held that evidence
established that commission acted unreasonably in reducing attorneys' fee
agreed to by attorneys and dissolved
corporation, but that refusal of compensation to parent holding company was
not unreasonable.
Order affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part.

